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Abstract
Despite a large body of literature on foreign aid effectiveness and significant international 
policy debate on the same topic, there is little consensus about how best to measure 
and compare the policy influence of international development organizations. In 2014, a 
group of researchers from AidData at the College of William & Mary conducted a first of 
its kind survey, involving more than 6,500 development policymakers and practitioners 
across 126 low-income and middle-income countries. The 2014 Reform Efforts Survey asked 
in-country policymakers and practitioners to draw upon their firsthand experiences and 
observations to evaluate the influence of international development organizations across 
23 different policy domains. This survey provides rich, micro-level data for researchers who 
wish to study nearly 100 international development organizations from a partner-country 
perspective. 
In this joint study, AidData and DEval make use of this rich source of data to test a number 
of hypotheses about the comparative strengths and weaknesses of Germany’s development 
cooperation, and to identify the factors that enable and constrain German development 
agencies in their efforts to influence the reform processes of partner countries.
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The German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) is 
mandated by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (BMZ) to independently analyse and 
assess German development interventions. 
Evaluation reports contribute to the transparency of devel-
opment results and provide policy-makers with evidence and 
lessons learned, based on which they can shape and improve 
their development policies.
This report can be downloaded as a PDF file from the DEval 
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Addressing a Major Knowledge Gap 
If international development cooperation is not only about 
delivering near-term results, but also about enabling long-term 
structural transformations, it must engage and support reform 
processes in partner countries. 
A particularly important lesson after more than six decades 
of international development cooperation with respect to 
external support for reforms, however, is that ownership 
matters – that is to say, partner countries should lead the 
design and implementation of reform efforts and external 
development partners should align their advice and assistance 
accordingly. When partner countries do not “own” reforms, 
they often renege or backtrack soon after aid is disbursed 
(World Bank 1998; Collier 1999). Furthermore, when external 
development partners engage in heavy-handed conditionality 
practices, they often pick the wrong conditions, demand too 
many conditions, or set arbitrary deadlines that short-circuit 
the domestic political processes needed to secure the buy-in 
of various parties with disparate interests (Boughton & Mour-
mouras 2004; IEO 2007; Koeberle et al. 2005; Smets & Knack 
2015). The ownership principle is also based on the assumption 
that partner countries – including the executive branch, the 
parliament, the judiciary, and the civil society actors who are 
responsible for formulating and implementing development 
policies and programs – ultimately understand the needs and 
challenges of their societies better than external actors and 
can more legitimately and effectively initiate, implement, and 
institutionalize reforms.
Another key lesson is that external support for domestic 
reforms in low-income and middle-income countries is 
rarely effective in the absence of strong coordination and 
an efficient division of labor between external development 
partners that supports partner country priorities (Pop-Eleches 
2009; Hernandez 2016; Bourguignon & Platteau 2015). Such 
coordination requires adequate institutional capacities on the 
partner country side. However, it also requires a substantially 
improved understanding of the comparative strengths and 
weaknesses of specific development partners.
These lessons were to some extent understood and appreci-
ated during the previous era of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). However, as many developing countries are 
now doubling down on efforts to strengthen their domestic 
resource mobilization capabilities and create public sector 
institutions that can deliver high-quality public services 
without ongoing external support, these lessons have assumed 
special significance in the post-2015 era of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) (Custer et al. 2015). 
It is therefore surprising how little systematic evidence exists 
on the experiences and perspectives of partner countries 
regarding the involvement of bilateral and multilateral 
development cooperation actors in agenda setting, policy 
advice provision, and reform implementation processes. 
How do politicians, public administrators, and civil society 
actors with the partner countries perceive the reform support 
provided by development partners? Specifically, how do 
they evaluate individual development partners with respect 
to the usefulness of their policy advice, their influence at 
the agenda-setting stage of the policymaking process, and 
their helpfulness during reform implementation? What do 
they regard as the comparative strengths and weaknesses of 
different development partners?  
From a German perspective, these questions are particularly 
interesting. Germany has reaffirmed its role as a key player 
in international development cooperation; yet, it also faces 
continued criticism for operating an overly complex aid system 
that risks undermining the partner orientation of its support.
Public debate about the specific strengths and weaknesses of 
the organizational set-up of the German aid system continues 
in part because there is little consensus about how best to 
measure the effectiveness of German development cooperation. 
Nor is there a credible body of evidence that speaks to the 
issue of whether, when, how, and why German development 
cooperation has influenced reform efforts in the developing 
world. Specifically, existing studies do not reveal much about 
the performance of German development partners from the 
perspective of the decision-makers in low-income and middle-in-
come countries whom they seek to influence and assist. 
The purpose of this joint study between the German Institute 
for Development Evaluation and AidData is to address this 
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knowledge gap by empirically evaluating the roles that 
German official development actors1 have played at different 
stages of the policymaking process in the developing world. 
Drawing upon first-of-its-kind evidence from the 2014 Reform 
Efforts Survey, we analyse the policy influence and perfor-
mance of GIZ, KfW, and German embassies, as observed, 
experienced, and reported by over one thousand governmen-
tal and non-governmental counterparts across more than 110 
low- and middle-income countries and territories. 
Specifically, in this study we seek to answer the following 
empirical questions from a partner country perspective:
 • How useful is policy advice provided by German develop-
ment actors, and which factors determine the usefulness of 
their advice from the perspective of in-country stakeholders 
(e.g., host government officials)?
 • How much influence do official German development ac-
tors have on the decisions that partner governments make 
to pursue reform, and which factors determine the extent 
to which official German development actors exert influ-
ence at the agenda-setting stage of the reform process?
 • How helpful are official German development actors in 
the implementation of reforms, and which factors shape 
the perceived helpfulness of German development actors 
during reform implementation?
 • In which policy areas and geographical regions do German 
development actors have particular strengths (or weakness-
es) in terms of usefulness of their policy advice, agenda-set-
ting influence, and helpfulness in reform implementation?
 • What are the comparative strengths (and weaknesses) 
of official German development actors relative to other 
bilateral and multilateral development partners in terms of 
usefulness of their policy advice, agenda-setting influence, 
and helpfulness in reform implementation? 
Main Findings
By analyzing the experience-based perceptions of German 
official development actors and comparing their performance 
to that of other development partners, we can identify two 
general patterns: First, survey participants do not perceive 
a clear division of roles and responsibilities between the 
three official German development actors with respect to 
how they engage at different stages of the reform process 
in partner countries. Instead, survey participants on average 
perceived the advice and assistance provided by GIZ to be 
particularly valuable at various stages (e.g., when reform prior-
ities are being established, when policy advice is provided, and 
when reforms are being implemented), in comparison to the 
other two German development actors.
Second, German development actors in general (with some 
positive exceptions for GIZ, and negative ones for embas-
sies) do not perform significantly better or worse than the 
average DAC bilateral development partner. Comparison 
with other bilateral and multilateral development partners re-
veals that the same finding holds true for other large bilateral 
development partners, such as DFID or USAID, which do not 
perform significantly better or worse than the DAC average 
(except for France’s AFD, which seems to perform less well in 
comparison to other major DAC bilateral donors). By contrast, 
survey participants rated large, multilateral organizations and 
small and yet highly specialized development partners (such 
as vertical funds) relatively high across the three different 
indicators of donor performance: policy advice usefulness, 
agenda-setting influence, and helpfulness during reform 
implementation. Among the top-rated bilateral development 
partners are those that are relatively small in size and yet have 
a clear geographical or developmental focus, including some of 
the major Nordic donor agencies like the Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA).
In addition, we find: Germany – like other large, DAC bilater-
al donors – punches below its financial weight in the sense 
that it has less influence on the reform priorities of its 
partner countries than one would expect, given the size of 
its annual aid budget. Specifically, we find that a development 
partner’s financial weight is a key factor that determines the 
degree to which it can exert influence at the agenda-setting 
stage of a partner country’s reform process; however, there 
is significant variation in the degree to which development 
partners efficiently convert their money into policy influence. 
Using the same methodology used in AidData’s Listening to 
Leaders report (Custer et al. 2015) but a different sample that is 
specific to this study, we calculate a Value for Money index that 
measures which development partners punch above or below 
1 While acknowledging their very different institutional status and mandates  respectively, in the interest of readability we refer to German embassies, GIZ and KfW Entwicklungsbank collectively as 
(official) German development actors throughout this report.
viiExecutive Summary  | 
their financial weight. We find that large multilateral donors, 
such as the World Bank and EU, exert greater-than-expected 
agenda-setting influence, while the five largest bilateral donors 
(the US, UK, Germany, Japan, and France) all punch below their 
financial weight. 
Germany has a comparative strength in the environmental 
sector. Survey participants, on average, report that reform 
advice and assistance from official German development 
actors is particularly useful in the environmental sector. Across 
various measures, Germany outperforms the average DAC 
bilateral donor in this policy area. However, the opposite is 
true in the area of governance; despite a strong rhetorical 
emphasis on good governance promotion, we find that 
Germany has comparatively less influence on the governance 
reform priorities of its counterpart countries.
Germany is regarded as a particularly influential and 
high-performing development partner in Europe and 
Central Asia and Middle East and North Africa. Survey 
participants from these two regions viewed official German 
development actors as more effective in providing useful 
reform advice and assistance, whereas participants from Latin 
America and the Caribbean viewed the performance of official 
German development actors less favourably than other DAC 
bilateral donors. 
In countries where Germany is a relatively large donor, 
German development actors tend to enjoy more influence 
with host government authorities. The relative weight of 
German aid – as a percentage of a given partner country’s 
overall aid budget from DAC donors – positively correlates 
with the reported influence of official German development 
actors at the agenda-setting stage of the policymaking process 
in partner countries. This finding suggests that there is 
wisdom in recent calls for increased country specialization and 
selectivity in Germany’s aid program. 
A distinct, but related, pattern is that Germany exerts 
greater development policy influence in less competitive 
environments. Specifically, Germany has greater agenda-set-
ting influence in partner countries where aid is less fragment-
ed – that is, in countries where fewer development actors are 
vying for influence with the host government. Germany, in 
effect, reaps a policy influence dividend when it chooses to 
focus its efforts in partner countries where the “aid market” is 
not highly competitive.
German aid buys more policy influence in autocratic coun-
tries and less influence in democratic countries. Specifically, 
we find that as the German share of a partner country’s total 
aid portfolio increases, so too does Germany’s agenda-setting 
influence. This effect is higher in more autocratic countries and 
lower in more democratic countries. The fact that Germany 
wields greater influence in a cohort of countries (less dem-
ocratic countries) that it generally disfavours at the partner 
selection stage of its aid allocation process demands greater 
discussion, debate, and organizational introspection.
Broad-based domestic support for reform in partner coun-
tries amplifies Germany’s development policy influence. 
Survey participants reported that Germany exerts greater 
influence on host government reform priorities when there is 
strong support from diverse group of domestic stakeholders 
(e.g., the head of state, the legislature, the judiciary, and civil 
society groups). Conversely, when the domestic coalition of 
actors in support of reform is less robust, Germany tends to 
enjoy lower levels of development policy influence. These 
findings raise the question of whether and how German 
development institutions and agencies can do a better job 
of identifying and focusing advisory and assistance efforts in 
the settings where they are likely to enjoy a policy influence 
dividend rather than face a policy influence penalty. 
Interpretation of Results and Opportunities for Further 
Research
How should these findings be interpreted in light of the nature 
of the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey and ongoing debates about 
the characteristics of Germany’s development cooperation 
system? There are several limitations imposed by this par-
ticular type of data and analysis. For one, it is important to 
keep in mind that the survey is focused on the performance of 
external development partners as it relates to the usefulness 
of policy advice that they provide, the influence that they exert 
on partner country priorities, and their helpfulness during the 
implementation of reforms. This study does not consider the 
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full range of international development cooperation activities 
supported by German and non-German aid agencies. One 
must also bear in mind that the time period covered by the 
survey (2004 – 2013) for the most part precedes the institu-
tional reorganization and reform of German development 
cooperation initiated in 2011. Therefore, no strong conclusions 
about the effects of these recent changes to the Germany’s 
development cooperation system should be drawn from the 
present analysis. A follow-up study would be necessary to 
better understand how recent changes have influenced, and 
potentially improved, interactions between German develop-
ment actors and their counterparts in partner countries. 
Also, even though the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey is based on 
experience-based perceptions from actors in partner coun-
tries, this evidence should not be equated with actual effec-
tiveness of German development cooperation. It represents 
one – important – perspective on this issue.      
All these limitations notwithstanding, the evidence produced 
by 2014 Reform Efforts Survey sheds new light on the questions 
put forward in this report by examining Germany’s compar-
ative advantages and disadvantages, as experienced and 
perceived by its partner country counterparts. This unique, 
“bottom-up” perspective represents an important source 
of evidence that, at the very least, merits careful attention 
from policymakers, implementing agencies, and development 
experts and practitioners. 
The survey did not attempt to account for all of the particular 
attributes of Germany’s development cooperation. Nor did it 
attempt to capture all of the different objectives and potential 
impacts of German development cooperation activities. 
However, it did pose a consistent set of questions about 
the quality of German’s engagement in and support for the 
reform efforts of partner countries. These survey questions 
were posed to participants in virtually every low-income 
and lower-middle income country in the world. These survey 
questions also produced consistent and comparable data for 
nearly 100 other bilateral and multilateral partners. As such, 
the scope of this survey provides an empirical foundation for 
drawing conclusions about Germany’s perceived comparative 
strengths and weaknesses. 
In this regard, the high level of “visibility” that German devel-
opment cooperation enjoys vis-à-vis its peers is remarkable: 
nearly 27% of the participants in our sample (1,200 of the 4,455 
survey participants whom we investigated in this study) report 
to have personally interacted with at least one of the three 
German development actors (GIZ, KfW, German embassies). 
GIZ’s above-average performance in providing policy advice 
for reforms is a positive and encouraging result given the 
importance this implementing agency ascribes to supporting 
partner county reform processes with policy advice. The same 
can be said of GIZ’s above-average performance in the envi-
ronment policy arena, as this reflects the growing importance 
of this core competency in German development cooperation 
cultivated over the course of the last two decades. 
At the same time, the overall results about the perceived 
value of German development cooperation are sobering. From 
the perspective of Germany’s partner country counterparts, 
the respective roles and responsibilities German embassies, 
GIZ, KfW are rather unclear, particularly with regard to 
the differentiation between more political agenda-setting 
activities and more technical implementation activities. The 
perceived absence of a division of labour between German 
development actors deserves careful attention. Given that the 
current structure of the German development cooperation 
system is justified on the basis of the need for a clear division 
of labour, this finding calls for more in-depth research on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the existing division of roles 
and responsibilities within the German aid system. Also, in 
light of the growing emphasis placed on the “partner orienta-
tion” of German development cooperation, there is a strong 
case for future empirical inquiry to evaluate whether and to 
what degree internal changes within the German development 
cooperation system have increased Germany’s performance 
and policy influence from the perspective of partner country 
counterparts.   
The results of this study are also sobering in that Germany is 
generally regarded as a middling performer in comparison to 
its peers. Specifically, in comparison to other DAC bilateral 
donors, German implementing agencies are perceived to be 
average performers in terms of the quality of the support 
that they provide for reform implementation activities 
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across all sectors, including governance and (except for GIZ) 
environment. This finding is particularly striking in light of the 
exceptionally strong field presence of German development 
cooperation in partner countries. Future analysis might 
therefore investigate whether the unique features of German 
development cooperation – such as its multi-level approach or 
specific financial cooperation modalities – actually represent 
comparative advantages in the competitive international 
development marketplace where donors increasingly offer a 
wide variety of ideas, instruments, and approaches.
In this respect, it would be worthwhile to examine whether, 
when, and how the diversification of German development 
cooperation activities across countries and sectors might 
affect its performance and competitiveness vis-à-vis devel-
opment partner peers. AidData’s Listening to Leaders report 
suggests that when aid agencies spread themselves too 
thinly across many countries and sectors they run the risk 
of becoming a jack-of-all trades and a master of none. If one 
accepts this proposition that specialization matters, it raises 
the question of whether German development partners might 
be able to increase their (perceived) level of effectiveness by 
increasing the geographical and sectoral concentration of 
their advisory and implementation activities. Future rounds of 
AidData’s survey of in-country development policymakers and 
practitioners will – to some extent – enable such analysis. At 
the same time, leveraging this survey vehicle to generate more 
qualitative information could help to provide more evidence 
on underlying causal mechanisms.
Finally, the finding that multilateral organizations seem to 
have a clear comparative advantage vis-à-vis bilateral develop-
ment partners when it comes to influencing policy decisions 
in partner countries touches upon the important question of 
whether Germany’s values and policy goals are more effec-
tively promoted by channelling assistance through bilateral or 
multilateral agencies. This suggests it might be worthwhile to 
also examine the effectiveness of Germany’s engagement in 
multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the EU.
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Kontext
Will Entwicklungszusammenarbeit nicht nur kurzfristige, 
sondern auch strukturelle Wirkungen entfalten, so muss sie 
deutliche Bezüge zu den Politik- und Reformprozessen in 
den Empfängerländern herstellen; sei es indem sie bei deren 
Gestaltung mitwirkt, diese politikberatend begleitet oder aber 
bei deren Implementierung einen Beitrag leistet. 
Eine wichtige Erkenntnis mit Blick auf die externe Unterstützu-
ng von Reformprozessen in Partnerländern besteht nach über 
sechs Jahrzehnten internationaler Entwicklungszusammenar-
beit darin, dass dabei dem „Ownership-Prinzip“ eine zentrale 
Bedeutung zukommt. Der Kern des Ownership-Prinzips 
besteht darin, dass eine effektive Entwicklungszusammenarbeit 
sich stark an den Interessen der für entwicklungszuträgliche 
Reformen relevanten Akteure in Partnerländern aus Regierung, 
Verwaltung, Parlament und Zivilgesellschaft auszurichten 
habe. Das Ownership-Prinzip geht dabei davon aus, dass diese 
Akteure letztlich die Bedürfnisse und Herausforderungen der 
Gesellschaften besser einschätzen können als externe Akteure 
und auch über die Legitimation für Reformprozesse verfügt. 
Fehlt es an Ownership der Partner, so äußert sich dies häufig 
in mangelndem Reformwillen und Reformabbrüchen oder 
-umkehr. Respektieren Geber hingegen das Ownership-Prinzip 
nicht und binden ihre Unterstützung beispielsweise an allzu 
strenge oder zahlreiche Konditionen, laufen sie Gefahr, 
politische Prozesse in den Partnerländern zu unterlaufen, die 
jedoch erforderlich sind, um eine breite Unterstützung ver-
schiedener Interessengruppen für die angestrebten Reformen 
herzustellen. 
Eine weitere wichtige Erkenntnis besteht darin, dass erfolg- 
reiche externe Unterstützung für Reformen in Niedrig- und 
Mitteleinkommensländern einer starken Koordination und effi-
zienter Arbeitsteilung in Übereinstimmung mit den Prioritäten 
der Partner bedarf. Diese Koordination erfordert zum einen 
hinreichende institutionelle Kapazitäten der Partner, zum 
anderen aber ein fundiertes Verständnis der komparativen 
Stärken und Schwächen der jeweiligen Entwicklungspartner.
Diese zentralen Erkenntnisse mit Blick auf Reformbetonung, 
das Ownership-Prinzip und Geberkoordination in der 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit haben nicht nur die gerade 
zu Ende gehen MDG-Phase geprägt, sondern diese werden 
vermutlich eine noch eine größere Rolle in dem anlaufenden 
SDG-Prozess spielen.
Wissenslücke
Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es erstaunlich, dass kaum sys-
tematische Evidenz darüber vorliegt, welche Erfahrungen die 
Handelnden aus Staat und Gesellschaft in Entwicklungslän-
dern eigentlich mit der Beteiligung von bi- und multilateralen 
Akteuren der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit bei der Re-
formgestaltung, Politikberatung und Reformimplementierung 
machen. 
Wie nehmen Politik, Verwaltung und Zivilgesellschaft in En-
twicklungsländern die Reformbeiträge einzelner Geber wahr? 
Welche Erfahrungen haben sie mit unterschiedlichen Gebern 
bei Agenda-Setting, Politikberatung und Reformimplementi-
erung und welche Stärken und Schwächen schreiben sie diesen 
aufgrund Ihrer Erfahrungen mit Blick auf unterschiedliche Poli-
tikfelder zu, die Gegenstand von Reformen waren? Fasst man 
die möglichen Impulse von externen Akteuren zudem auch 
als einen kreativen Wettbewerb um Ideen und Konzepte bzw. 
deren Implementierung auf, dann ist der skizzierte Mangel an 
systematischer, politikfeld- und länderübergreifender Evidenz 
umso verwunderlicher.
Aus Perspektive der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit 
(EZ) sind diese offenen Fragen besonders interessant. Einer-
seits hat Deutschland seine Rolle als wichtiger Akteur in der 
internationalen EZ zuletzt mehrfach bekräftigt und durch teils 
erheblichen Ressourcenaufwuchs untermauert. Gleichzeitig 
sieht sich das deutsche EZ-System fortgesetzter Kritik an   
seiner hohen Komplexität ausgesetzt, aufgrund derer die 
Partnerorientierung der deutschen EZ gegebenenfalls leiden 
könne. Die öffentliche Debatte um die spezifischen Stärken 
und Schwächen des institutionellen Aufbaus des deutschen 
EZ-Systems hält auch deshalb an, weil keine allgemein 
anerkannten Methoden existieren, mit denen die Wirksamkeit 
deutscher EZ abschließend zu beurteilen wäre. Gleichermaßen 
existiert auf globaler Ebene keine überzeugende empirische 
Evidenz dazu, ob, wann, wie oder warum die deutsche EZ in 
der Lage war, Reformanstrengungen in Partnerländern zu 
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beeinflussen. Insbesondere liegen kaum gesicherte Erkennt-
nisse darüber vor, wie Entscheidungsträger in Niedrig- und 
Mitteleinkommensländern, die Reformen initiieren und 
umsetzen sollen, die Leistungsfähigkeit deutscher EZ-Akteure 
bei der Gestaltung und Unterstützung ihrer Reformanstregungen 
beurteilen.
Datenbasis & Fragestellungen des Berichts
In dem vorliegenden Bericht, einem Kooperationsprojekt 
zwischen AidData und DEval, wird versucht auf diese Fragen 
erste Antworten zu geben und dabei speziell die Rolle zentral-
er Akteure aus der staatlichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit 
Deutschlands zu untersuchen. Dabei greift der Bericht auf die 
Daten einer weltweit angelegten Umfrage von AidData zurück 
- dem 2014 Reform Efforts Survey. Befragt wurden Akteure 
aus Staat und Gesellschaft in über 120 Entwicklungsländern 
hinsichtlich ihrer Erfahrungen mit Organisationen aus der bi- 
und multilateralen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Zeitraum 
zwischen 2004 und 2013. Für den vorliegenden Bericht wurden 
knapp 4500 Fragebögen von Personen des öffentlichen 
wie auch zivilgesellschaftlichen und privatwirtschaftlichen 
Sektors ausgewertet, wobei hiervon mehr als 1200 Befragte 
Einschätzungen zu der Zusammenarbeit mit den Deutschen 
Botschaften, der GIZ (GTZ) und KfW gegeben haben, die auf 
eigenen und konkreten Erfahrungen basierten. Entsprechend 
ermöglichte diese Datenbasis, folgende Fragestellungen aus 
Sicht der Partnererfahrungen zu analysieren:
 • Als wie nützlich wurde die Politikberatung empfunden, die 
die genannten deutschen Akteure angeboten haben und 
hatten individuelle und länderspezifischen Faktoren einen 
Einfluss hierauf?
 • Wie groß war der Einfluss, den die genannten deutschen 
Akteure gemäß den Erfahrungen der Akteure in Entwick-
lungsländern auf die Entscheidung in ihren Ländern 
ausübten, Reformen zu verfolgen (Agenda-Setting) und 
hatten individuelle und länderspezifischen Faktoren einen 
Einfluss das Antwortverhalten?
 • Als wie hilfreich wurden die genannten deutschen Akteure 
aus Partnersicht bei der Umsetzung von Reformen in 
Partnerländern wahrgenommen und hatten individuelle 
und länderspezifische Faktoren einen Einfluss hierauf?
 • Verfügten die genannten deutschen Akteure im Vergleich 
zu anderen Gebern über komparative Stärken (oder 
Schwächen) mit Blick auf ihre Beiträge beim Agenda-Set-
ting, bei der Politikberatung und bei der Implementi-
erungsunterstützung im Allgemeinen und mit Blick auf 
spezifische Sektoren (z.B. Umwelt, Governance, soziale 
Sektoren)?
 • In welchen Ländern bzw. Weltregionen verfügten deutsche 
EZ-Akteure über spezifische Stärken (oder Schwächen) in 
Bezug auf die wahrgenommene Nützlichkeit ihrer Politik-
beratung, ihren Einfluss auf die Reformagenda, sowie auf 
die Unterstützung bei der Umsetzung von Reformen?
Ergebnisse
Die zentralen Ergebnisse der Untersuchung sind im Folgenden 
aufgeführt. Dabei lassen sich zwei Hauptmuster in den 
Ergebnissen identifizieren: 
 • Aggregiert man die Ergebnisse der Analyse, so zeigt sich zu-
nächst einmal, dass sich aus der Wahrnehmung der Akteure 
in Entwicklungsländern keine eindeutige Rollenverteilung 
oder Arbeitsteilung zwischen den deutschen Botschaften 
und den beiden staatlichen Durchführungsorganisation 
GIZ (früher GTZ) und KfW in Bezug auf Politikberatung, 
Agenda-Setting und Umsetzungsunterstützung erkennen 
lässt. Vielmehr schätzen die Teilnehmerinnen und Teil- 
nehmer der Befragung die Beratung und Unterstützung der 
GIZ in allen drei Bereichen (bei der Prioritätensetzung, bei 
der Bereitstellung von Politikberatung, bei der Reformum-
setzung) als wertvoller im Vergleich zu den beiden anderen 
Akteuren ein.
 • Zweitens werden deutsche EZ-Akteure (mit einigen 
positiven Ausnahmen für die GIZ und negativen für die 
deutschen Botschaften) von Befragten in den Partnerlän-
dern nicht signifikant besser oder schlechter eingeschätzt 
als der Durchschnitt der bilateralen OECD/DAC-Geber. 
Gleiches gilt für andere große bilaterale Akteure wie DFID, 
USAid oder JICA; lediglich die französische AFD schnitt in 
allen drei Bereichen signifikant unterdurchschnittlich ab. 
Auffällig ist weiterhin, dass große multilaterale Organisa-
tionen und kleine hoch spezialisierte Geberorganisationen 
– wie etwa vertikale Fonds – von den Befragten in allen drei 
Kategorien (Nützlichkeit der Politikberatung, Einfluss auf 
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die Reformagenda, hilfreiche Unterstützung bei der Refor-
mumsetzung) als vergleichsweise stark wahrgenommen 
werden. Unter den am höchsten bewerteten bilateralen 
Akteuren finden sich solche, deren EZ bei relativ kleinen 
Mittelvolumen geographisch oder sektoral vergleichsweise 
stark konzentriert ist, darunter einige der größeren skandi-
navischen Geber wie die dänische DANIDA. 
Darüber hinaus zeigt sich:
 • Deutschland – wie auch andere bilaterale DAC-Geber – übt 
in der Wahrnehmung von Entscheidungsträgern in seinen 
Partnerländern einen geringeren Einfluss auf Reformpri-
oritäten in diesen Ländern aus, als das Mittelvolumen 
seiner EZ erwarten ließe. Die Analysen zeigen, dass der 
Einfluss auf das Agenda-Setting bei Reformen stark durch 
das Volumen der EZ beeinflusst wird, während sich ein 
solcher Zusammenhang mit Blick auf die Nützlichkeit von 
Politikberatung und Implementierungsunterstützung nicht 
zeigt. Gleichzeitig variiert der Zusammenhang zwischen 
Mittelvolumen und wahrgenommenem Politikeinfluss 
erheblich zwischen Gebern. Basierend auf der gleichen 
Methode, die auch in der AidData-Studie Listening to 
Leaders (Custer et al. 2015) Anwendung findet, wurde ein 
Value for Money Index berechnet, anhand dessen sich 
beurteilen lässt, inwiefern ein Geber Einfluss über oder 
unter seiner „finanziellen Gewichtsklasse“ ausübt. Gemes-
sen an dem eingesetzten Mittelvolumen wird der deutsche 
Einfluss auf das Agenda-Setting bei Reformen (wie auch der 
Einfluss der übrigen vier größten bilateralen Geber USA, 
Vereinigtes Königreich, Japan und Frankreich) allerdings 
unterdurchschnittlich wahrgenommen, während der 
Einfluss der multilateralen Banken und der EU auch dann 
noch als überdurchschnittlich wahrgenommen wurde, wenn 
man deren finanzielles Gewicht berücksichtigt.  
 • Was sektorspezifische komparative Vorteile der deutschen 
Akteure in der erfahrungsbasierten Wahrnehmung der 
Akteure aus Partnerländern anbelangt, so wird erstens 
ein komparativer Vorteil der GIZ (GTZ) im Umweltsektor 
deutlich. Sowohl bei der Politikberatung wie auch beim 
Agenda-Setting und der Reformimplementierung liegt 
die deutsche Durchführungsorganisation über dem 
Durchschnitt der bilateralen DAC-Geber. Für die KfW gilt 
Gleiches für den Umweltsektor im Bereich des Agenda-Set-
ting. Ebenfalls überdurchschnittlich schneidet die GIZ (GTZ) 
im Sektor Landwirtschaft im Bereich des Agenda-Setting 
ab. In anderen Sektoren wie etwa bei Governance bzw. 
Regierungsführung oder den sozialen Sektoren ist in der 
erfahrungsbasierten Wahrnehmung der Partner keine 
sektorspezifisch überdurchschnittliche Performanz der drei 
deutschen Akteure bei Politikberatung, Agenda-Setting 
oder Implementierungsunterstützung erkennbar.
 • Deutschland wird besonders in Ländern der Regionen 
Europa und Zentralasien sowie Naher Osten und Nordafrika 
als einflussreicher und leistungsstarker Entwicklunspartner 
wahrgenommen. Befragte aus diesen Regionen bewerteten 
deutsche EZ-Akteure positiver in Hinblick auf ihre ge-
leistete Politikberatung und Reformunterstützung. Befragte 
in Lateinamerika und der Karibik hingegen schätzten 
die Leistungsfähigkeit deutscher EZ-Akteure im Schnitt 
geringer ein als die anderer bilateraler DAC-Geber.
 • Befragte aus Ländern, in denen das Volumen deutscher EZ 
einen relativ hohen Stellenwert im Vergleich zu anderen 
Gebern hatte, konstatierten einen stärkeren Einfluss auf die 
Reformagenda. Dieser Effekt ist ausgeprägter in autoritär 
regierten Ländern. Eine naheliegende Interpretation dieses 
Ergebnisses ist, dass in autoritären Regimen externe Ak-
teure mit hohem finanziellen Gewicht – aufgrund geringer 
gesellschaftlicher Partizipation – einen höheren Einfluss auf 
die Reformagenda nehmen können. Die Nützlichkeit der 
Politikberatung und der Implementierungsunterstützung 
bleibt hiervon jedoch unberührt.
 • Ebenso zeigt die Analyse, dass Deutschland größeren 
entwicklungspolitischen Einfluss ausübt in Ländern mit 
geringerem Geberwettbewerb. In Ländern mit geringerer 
Geberfragmentierung, in denen weniger Geber um Einfluss 
auf die Partnerregierung konkurrieren, wird Deutschland 
ein größerer Einfluss auf das Agenda-Setting attestiert.  
 • Unabhängig von der objektiven Charakterisierung eines 
Landes als mehr oder weniger demokratisch, vermerken 
Befragte, die eine breiten gesellschaftlichen Konsens für 
den von ihnen bearbeiteten Reformbereich in ihrem Land 
konstatieren, einen stärkeren Einfluss bzw. eine höhere 
Nützlichkeit deutscher Akteure. Dort, wo also eine breitere 
Ownership für eine bestimmte Reform vorhanden ist, 
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werden deutsche Aktivitäten bei der Politikberatung, beim 
Agenda-Setting und bei der Reformimplementierung als 
nützlicher bzw. relevanter wahrgenommen.
Interpretation der Ergebnisse
Wie sind die skizzierten Ergebnisse in ihrer Gesamtschau vor 
dem Hintergrund der Anlage des 2014 Reform-Efforts-Surveys 
und vor dem Hintergrund der Diskussion um die deutsche 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit bzw. deren Strukturen und 
Ausrichtung zu interpretieren?
Die spezifische Datengrundlage der Studie bringt eine Reihe 
von Einschränkungen mit sich, die bei der Interpretation der 
Ergebnisse berücksichtigt werden müssen. Was die Anlage der 
Umfrage anbelangt ist anzumerken, dass deren Ausrichtung 
auf die Rolle externer Geber bei Gestaltung, Beratung und 
Implementierung von Reformen in Entwicklungsländern 
ausgerichtet ist und daher nicht alle Aktivitäten der Entwick-
lungszusammenarbeit umfasst. Zudem ist die Umfrage nicht 
auf alle organisatorischen Spezifika der deutschen Entwick-
lungszusammenarbeit ausgerichtet; die Umfrage umfasst 
bspw. nicht die Aktivitäten nicht-staatlicher Akteure wie der 
politischen Stiftungen oder kirchlicher Hilfsorganisationen. Zu 
beachten ist fernerhin, dass der Zeitraum der Untersuchung 
(2005-2013) im Wesentlichen vor der Reform des deutschen EZ 
Vorfeldes aus dem Jahre 2011 liegt, sodass aus den Ergebnissen 
dieser Analyse noch keine Schlüsse auf die Effekte dieser 
Reform gezogen werden können. Schließlich handelt es sich 
bei der Befragung um – wenn auch erfahrungsbasierte – 
Beurteilungen durch Akteure aus Partnerländern, die nur eine 
Perspektive auf die Wirksamkeit deutscher EZ darstellen, und 
die um themen- oder instrumentenspezifische Evaluierungen 
ergänzt werden sollten, um ein ganzheitliches Bild zu erhalten. 
Gleichwohl birgt die Auswertung des Reform-Efforts-Survey 
große Vorteile. So wird die Bedeutung von Reformen und 
deren Begleitung durch Beratung und Implementierungsun-
terstützung von allen Akteuren der deutschen staatlichen 
EZ hervorgehoben, so dass eine Befragung über die Rolle 
deutscher Akteure beim Agenda-Setting von Reformen, bei der 
Politikberatung und der Implementierungsunterstützung wich-
tiges Orientierungswissen für politische Entscheidungsträger, 
Durchführungsorganisationen und die breitere Fachöffent- 
lichkeit liefert. Auch die global gehaltene Befragung, die nur 
begrenzt auf die organisatorischen Spezifika der deutschen 
EZ Bezug nimmt, kann als Vorteil gewertet werden. Denn nur 
durch die auf die Gesamtheit der Geber orientierte Befragung 
von wichtigen Partnern in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenlän-
dern wird es möglich, die Akteure der deutschen EZ in einen 
Gesamtkontext der internationalen EZ zu stellen und Aussa-
gen über die erfahrungsbasierte Wahrnehmung von Stärken 
und Schwächen der deutschen EZ zu treffen.
Vor diesem Hintergrund spiegeln die Ergebnisse eine 
vergleichsweise hohe „Sichtbarkeit“ der deutschen EZ wider. 
Immerhin rund 1200 Befragte aus der Grundgesamtheit von 
4455 haben bereits einmal mit einem der drei genannten 
deutschen Akteure zusammengearbeitet. Wenig überraschend 
ist hierbei, dass die Zusammenarbeit mit deutschen Akteuren 
überproportional in jenen Entwicklungs- und Schwellenlän-
dern stattgefunden hat, die den Status eines Partnerlandes 
der deutschen EZ hatten. Zu begrüßen ist das im Vergleich zu 
anderen bilateralen Gebern überdurchschnittliche Abschneid-
en der GIZ (GTZ) im Bereich der Politikberatung bei Reformen. 
Es entspricht der Bedeutung, die diese Durchführungsorga- 
nisation der reformbegleitenden Beratung beimisst. Gleiches 
gilt für das überdurchschnittliche Abschneiden der GIZ (GTZ) 
im Umweltsektor was das Agenda-Setting, die Politikberatung 
und die Implementierungsunterstützung anbelangt – ein 
Befund, der den Bedeutungszuwachs dieses Politikfeldes in 
der deutschen EZ während der vergangenen beiden Jahrzehnte 
reflektiert. 
Gleichwohl sprechen die Befunde insgesamt eher für eine 
mittelmäßige Leistungsfähigkeit der deutschen EZ aus Sicht 
der Partner. So war aus deren Perspektive die Rollen- bzw. 
Arbeitsteilung zwischen den deutschen Akteuren (Botschaf-
ten, GIZ, KfW) insgesamt eher unklar, insbesondere was die 
Arbeitsteilung zwischen politischem Agenda-Setting und 
Implementierung anbelangt. Da dieser Aspekt der Arbeitstei-
lung ein wichtiger Rechtfertigungsgrund für die spezifische 
Aufstellung des deutschen EZ-Systems ist, geben die hier 
skizzierten Befunde Anlass für weitergehende Untersuchun-
gen zur Arbeitsteilung zwischen politischer Steuerung und 
Implementierung im deutschen EZ-System. Gerade angesichts 
|  Zusammenfassungxiv
der kontinuierlich steigenden Bedeutung von „Partnerschaft-
lichkeit“ in der deutschen und internationalen EZ bedarf es 
auch weiterer Untersuchungen, welche die Auswirkungen der 
jüngeren institutionellen und organisatorischen Reformen in 
der deutschen EZ auf deren Leistungsfähigkeit aus Partner-
sicht in den Blick nehmen.
Darüber hinaus zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die deutschen 
Durchführungsorganisationen im Bereich der Implementie- 
rungsunterstützung von Reformen im bilateralen Vergleich 
lediglich als durchschnittlich wahrgenommen werden. Dieser 
Befund ist in allen betrachteten Sektoren anzutreffen, auch 
im Governance-Bereich und – mit Ausnahme der GIZ – im 
Umweltsektor. Die vor dem Hintergrund der ausgeprägten 
Präsenz deutscher Durchführungsorganisationen vor Ort 
insgesamt eher mittelmäßigen Ergebnisse hinsichtlich der 
wahrgenommenen komparativen Stärken im bilateralen 
Vergleich sollte daher Gegenstand weiterführender, stärker 
vergleichender Analysen sein. So könnte etwa untersucht 
werden, inwiefern bei potentiellen Alleinstellungsmerkmalen 
der deutschen EZ - wie dem Mehrebenen-Ansatz oder 
speziellen FZ Modalitäten - im internationalen Wettbewerb 
um effektive Ideen, Instrumente und Ansätze tatsächlich 
noch ein Wettbewerbsvorteil besteht. Darüber hinaus könnte 
untersucht werden, inwiefern die ausgeprägte Diversifizierung 
der deutschen EZ mit Blick auf Länder und Sektoren eine 
Herausforderung für deren Wettbewerbsfähigkeit ist. So 
wird etwa bei der Analyse der AidData Umfrage deutlich, 
dass neben den großen multilateralen Organisationen wie 
Weltbank oder EU vor allem jene Geber als vergleichsweise 
stark wahrgenommen werden, die sektoral und/oder regional 
konzentriert sind. Entsprechend sollte untersucht werden, ob 
und wie deutsche EZ-Organisationen ihre Wirksamkeit durch 
stärker sektorale und/oder geographische Konzentration ihrer 
Beratungs- und Unterstützungsleistungen erhöhen können. 
Die Analyse künftiger Runden des Reform Efforts Surveys 
könnte in systematisch ausgewählten Ländern bzw. Sektoren 
ausgeweitet werden und zudem auch durch eine stärker 
qualitativere Befragung mit einem mehr an Tiefenschärfe 
versehen werden, die mehr Auskunft über die Ursachen der 
Befragungsergebnisse geben kann.
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1.1
The International Aid and Development Effective-
ness Debate in 2015
The year 2015 marks a major milestone in international devel-
opment cooperation. With the transition from the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) to the post-2015 Sustainable De-
velopment Goals (SDGs) under the so-called “Agenda 2030”, 
the scope of the global development agenda is broadening far 
beyond the traditional focus on aid and poverty reduction; it 
now takes into account a wide range of socio-economic, polit-
ical, and ecological targets in poor and rich countries that fall 
within a sustainable global development framework. 
Yet the lessons learned over the last six decades of develop-
ment aid will likely be critical during the post-2015 SDG era 
(Custer et al. 2015). One key lesson is that if international de-
velopment cooperation is not only about delivering near-term 
results, but also about enabling long-term structural transfor-
mations, it must engage and support country-owned reform 
processes. That is to say, partner countries should lead the de-
sign and implementation of reform efforts and external devel-
opment partners should align their advice and assistance ac-
cordingly. When partner countries do not “own” reforms, they 
often renege or backtrack soon after aid is disbursed (World 
Bank 1998; Collier 1999). Furthermore, when external develop-
ment partners engage in heavy-handed conditionality practic-
es, they often pick the wrong conditions, demand too many 
conditions, or set arbitrary deadlines that short-circuit the do-
mestic political processes needed to secure the buy-in of vari-
ous parties with disparate interests (Boughton & Mourmouras 
2004; IEO 2007; Koeberle et al. 2005; Smets & Knack 2015). 
This principle of ownership is based on the assumption that 
partner countries – including the executive branch, the parlia-
ment, the judiciary and the civil society actors who are respon-
sible for formulating and implementing development policies 
and programs – ultimately understand the needs and challeng-
es of their societies better than external actors and can more 
legitimately and effectively initiate, implement, and institu-
tionalize reforms. The ownership principle also implies an ob-
ligation for partner countries to strictly orient the formulation 
and implementation of reforms towards the common welfare 
of their societies (Faust 2010). 
A second key lesson is that external support for domestic re-
forms in low-income and middle-income countries is rarely ef-
fective in the absence of strong coordination and an efficient 
division of labor between external development partners that 
supports partner country priorities (Pop-Eleches 2009; Her-
nandez 2016; Bourguignon & Platteau 2015). Such coordination 
not only requires adequate institutional capacities on the re-
cipient side, but also a substantially improved understanding 
of the comparative strengths and weaknesses of specific devel-
opment partners. Therefore, many traditional donors will need 
to adapt – from mere providers of financial resources to actors 
that understand and hone their areas of expertise and help ef-
fectuate policy and institutional change in their respective ar-
eas of comparative advantage (Custer et al. 2015). Develop-
ment partners who wish to maintain a competitive edge in the 
post-2105 era need the “capacity to broker partnerships, un-
derstand how to support and promote enabling environments 
for private sector-led growth, tackle market failures, and bring 
knowledge of emerging approaches around the world to policy 
areas ranging from social protection to green growth and cli-
mate resilience.” (House of Commons 2015, p. 42). 
At the same time, as developing countries become less de-
pendent on aid while aid fragmentation remains high, devel-
opment partners will increasingly need to vie “for influence 
over the policies of the recipient government” (Acharya et al. 
2006, p. 7; Anderson 2012; Kimura et al. 2012; Frot & Sanitos 
2010; Knack & Rahman 2007; Janus et al. 2014). As such, the in-
ternational donors who wish to remain relevant, influential, 
and competitive in the post-2015 era will most likely be those 
who are perceived as capable of providing useful policy advice, 
shaping reform priorities, and facilitating the implementation 
and institutionalization of reforms.
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1.2
Are German Development Actors Ready to 
Compete in the Post-2015 Era?
At this critical point in the transformation of the global devel-
opment agenda, Germany has reaffirmed its role as a key play-
er. Germany’s official development assistance (ODA) is at an 
all-time high – at USD 16.25 billion (2014), equivalent to 0.41% 
of its gross national income (GNI). This represents a 14.2% in-
crease over 2013. Germany is the 3rd largest bilateral DAC do-
nor in terms of volume and the 10th in terms of its ODA as a 
percentage of GNI2. The government’s budget proposal for 
2016 envisages an increase in the budget of the German Fed-
eral Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ), which accounts for some 50-60% of German ODA, by 
some € 860 million, making it the highest development aid 
budget in the history of the Federal Republic at €7.4 billion 
(BMZ 2015a). Moreover, Germany is continuously seeking in-
novation in both policy and implementation as a way of re-
sponding appropriately to changes in the global development 
landscape (OECD-DAC 2015, p. 57).
At the same time, Germany faces continued criticism for oper-
ating an overly complex aid system that risks undermining the 
partner orientation of its development cooperation. The 2005 
DAC peer review, for instance, identified several critical weak-
nesses with regard to the organizational set-up of the German 
development co-operation system, stating that “Germany’s 
fragmented institutional system means that (i) it is confusing 
to its partners; (ii) it is time consuming for BMZ to co-ordinate 
Germany’s various agencies (perhaps more so than coordinat-
ing other donors and partner governments); (iii) it runs the risk 
of being supply-driven and of limited contestability; and (iv) it 
is weighted far too heavily towards the implementing agencies 
at the expense of BMZ capacity, undermining the latter’s abil-
ity to oversee the system” (OECD-DAC 2010, p. 61-2). In addi-
tion, Germany’s aid has drawn criticism for being too widely 
spread across countries and sectors. 
Despite important reforms in recent years (see Box 1 below), 
the latest DAC Peer Review of 2015 (OECD-DAC 2015) repeats 
this criticism. German policymakers commonly justify this 
complex configuration of the German aid system on the ba-
sis that its strong implementation capacity allows it to use 
bilateral development cooperation as an instrument to pro-
mote values such as good governance, social cohesion, and 
ecological sustainability abroad. Indeed, a 2007 study under-
taken by the German Development Institute noted that Ger-
many’s then-largest aid agency (GTZ) “claim[ed] to have a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis other donors” in knowing how 
best to influence reform processes and outcomes in develop-
ing countries (Altenburg 2007, p. 3).
However, existing debate about where German development 
actors possess such particular expertise—and exert significant 
influence on the reform activities of partner countries—rests 
upon a remarkably fragile empirical foundation. The case study 
literature has produced some valuable insights, but it has not 
yielded a generalizable body of knowledge about the condi-
tions under which German development co-operation has up-
stream influence on agenda-setting and reform design pro-
cesses and downstream impact on reform implementation 
outcomes. There are also several large-sample empirical stud-
ies of German aid effectiveness, but they rely mostly on aggre-
gate measures of development outcomes at the country level 
(e.g., economic growth or governance) and they shed very little 
light on the question of whether, when, how, and why German 
development actors affect the reform priorities, reform design 
features, and reform implementation efforts of counterpart 
countries (Minoiu & Reddy 2010; Stone 2010; Kersting & Kil-
by 2014).3 Existing research also offers little to no insight about 
the comparative strengths of German development partners. 
In short, neither the small-sample qualitative literature nor 
the large-sample quantitative literature has produced a cred-
ible body of evidence that speaks to the issue of whether, 
when, how, and why German development cooperation has in-
fluenced reform efforts in the developing world. Nor do exist-
ing studies reveal much about the policy influence and per-
formance of German development partners from the perspec-
tive of the decision-makers in low-income and middle-income 
countries who they seek to influence and assist. The purpose 
of this study is to address this knowledge gap. Answering this 
question is particularly relevant to official German develop-
ment actors, as they see their technical and financial support 
as an important instrument to help improve the regulatory en-
vironments and institutions of their partner countries (BMZ 
2013, p. 16; BMZ 2011). 
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Box 1: Reforming Germany’s Aid System
In recent years Germany has made significant efforts to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its develop-
ment operations abroad and has also made further efforts 
at concentrating its bilateral development cooperation. 
Following the 2005 OECD-DAC Peer Review, Germany 
narrowed down the sectoral focus of its bilateral develop-
ment cooperation to 11 priority areas (OECD-DAC 2010, 
p. 13) and in 2011-12 reduced to 50 (down from 92 in 2005) 
the number of partner countries that benefit from a full 
program of bilateral cooperation with up to three priority 
sectors per country (OECD-DAC 2015, p. 46). In addition, 
Germany also engages in a further 29 countries under 
thematic or regional programs and only one priority area 
per country (Ibid., p. 50, BMZ 2015b, p. 60).
On the implementation side, reform efforts culminated 
with the 2011 establishment of Gesellschaft für Interna-
tionale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), formed by the merger of 
three major German technical co-operation agencies—
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 
Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED), and Internationale 
Weiterbildung und Entwicklung GmbH (InWEnt).
Despite these recent reforms, however, key features of the 
German aid system remain unchanged (OECD-DAC 2015, 
p. 53). Germany continues to be one of the few countries 
with a dedicated development ministry (BMZ) represent-
ed at the cabinet level, which delegates implementation 
of its aid budget (financial and technical cooperation have 
separate budgets) predominantly to two powerful, govern-
ment-owned – yet institutionally independent – agencies: 
GIZ (for technical cooperation) and KfW Entwicklungs-
bank4 (for financial cooperation).
In terms of staff size, GIZ is the largest German official 
development institution; it employs approximately 17,000 
staff employees (as of 2012), and the vast majority of these 
staff are based in the field as national personnel providing 
technical assistance to Germany’s partner countries 
(GIZ 2012). Its operational reach is global and cuts across 
virtually all sectors, including economic development, 
infrastructure, health, agriculture, education, environ-
ment, governance, and peace building. Though the same 
is true of KfW’s operational reach and sectoral focus, it is 
much smaller in terms of staff size. In 2009, KfW (includ-
ing its private sector arm DEG) employed only 818 staff 
at headquarters and 78 field staff, who were supported by 
250 local staff (OECD-DAC 2010, p. 66).5
While the implementing agencies—GIZ and KfW (albeit to 
a much lesser extent)— thus have a strong presence in the 
countries where they operate, the BMZ is not represented 
directly with its own offices in partner countries, as is the 
case with other donors with corresponding ministries or 
departments (e.g., the U.K.’s Department for International 
Development). Instead, the BMZ is represented through 
Germany’s network of overseas embassies, where staff 
seconded from BMZ assume development cooperation-re-
lated responsibilities, which according to the formal setup 
include:
 • Analysing the conditions and options for effective 
development cooperation in the host country, including 
continual review of existing projects and programs; 
 • Reporting to the German Government on the political, 
economic and social situation in the developing 
countries; 
 • Coordinating German development cooperation and 
German implementing organizations (e.g., GIZ, KfW) in 
the host country; 
 • Explaining the German Government’s policy and dia-
logue on sustainable development to the various social 
strata and groups in the host country (e.g. ministers, 
NGOs); and
 • Helping to coordinate German aid activities with other 
bilateral and multilateral donors.6 
 
As part of the recent reform process, the embassies 
2 See the following link: http://www.bmz.de/de/ministerium/zahlen_fakten/geber/index.html
3 See De & Becker 2015, BenYishay et al. 2015, Metzger & Günther 2013, and Hemmer & Lorenz 2003. All of these studies seek to measure the impact of a discrete German aid program or a portfolio of 
German aid investments. 
4 Hereafter, KfW refers to KfW Entwicklungsbank.
5 Budget allocations to financial and technical cooperation from the BMZ’s budget are, in turn, of roughly similar volume.
6 See the following link: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/GlobaleFragen/Entwicklung/BilatEZ-Start_node.html
5were in addition formally tasked with leading the sector 
policy dialogue with partners, thereby clarifying their role 
and mandate in relation to the two main implementing 
agencies. 
Over the past five years BMZ has also substantially 
strengthened its field presence in partner countries by 
seconding some 46 additional staff members to embassies 
in partner countries, an increase by almost 80% (OECD-
DAC 2015, p. 54). However, all BMZ staff working at the 
embassies formally become part of the foreign service, 
and report officially to the Foreign Office, rather than 
BMZ. While this system presumably fosters consistency in 
Germany’s overall approach to partner countries, the 2015 
OECD-DAC Peer Review finds that the existent structure 
tends to complicate the information and feedback loop 
between BMZ and the implementing agencies at head-
quarters and in the field (Ibid., p. 56). 
It is important to bear in mind that the time period 
covered by this study (2004 – 2013) for the most part 
precedes these important institutional reorganizations 
and reforms of German development cooperation.
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7 Note that, while acknowledging the very different institutional status and mandates of German embassies, GIZ and KfW, for the sake of readability, we refer to all three organizations as “German 
development actors” throughout this report.
1.3
Empirical Questions
In this report, we empirically evaluate the roles that official 
German development actors7 play at different stages of the 
policymaking process in the developing world. Drawing upon 
the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey, we analyse the perceived in-
fluence and performance of GIZ, KfW, and German embassies 
as observed, experienced, and reported by over a thousand 
governmental and non-governmental counterparts across over 
110 low- and middle-income countries and territories.
Specifically, in this study we seek to answer the following 
empirical questions from a partner country’s perspective:
 • How useful is policy advice provided by German develop-
ment actors?
 • How much influence do official German development 
actors have on the decisions that partner governments take 
to pursue reform?
 • How helpful are official German development actors in the 
implementation of reforms?
 • In which policy areas and geographical regions do German 
development actors have particular strengths (or weakness-
es) in terms of usefulness of policy advice, agenda-setting 
influence, and helpfulness in reform implementation?
 • What are the comparative strengths (and weaknesses) 
of official German development actors relative to other 
bilateral and multilateral development partners in terms of 
usefulness of policy advice, agenda-setting influence, and 
helpfulness in reform implementation? 
In addition, we ask which factors determine:
 • the frequency at which policy advice provided by official 
German development actors is regarded as useful by 
in-country stakeholders;
 • the extent to which official German development actors are 
perceived to influence the host government’s decision to 
pursue reform agendas; and 
 • the extent to which the involvement of official German 
development actors in partner governments’ reform 
implementation is regarded as helpful.
It is important to note that the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey 
covers a period (2004-2013), which mostly pre-dates the 
major organizational changes that have recently taken place 
within Germany’s development cooperation system and 
that are described in Box 1. Although these changes did not 
fundamentally alter the overall organizational set-up of the 
German development cooperation system, it is possible that 
these reforms have influenced partner perceptions of the 
performance German development actors. Future waves 
of the survey will provide greater insight into how recent 
changes within the German aid system may have influenced 
the way that domestic stakeholders in partner countries (e.g., 
government officials, non-governmental organization or civil 
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society leaders) interact with and evaluate the performance of 
individual German development actors. 
1.4
Report Structure
This report is organized in the following manner. First, in 
Section 2 we provide a detailed description of the 2014 Reform 
Efforts Survey and the geographical and sectoral composition 
of the survey participants in our sample. Second, in Section 
3 we provide a descriptive analysis of survey participants’ 
perspectives on the relative performance of official German 
development actors in shaping reform processes across 
different sectors and regions. We evaluate three different 
dimensions of Germany’s performance: the usefulness of its 
policy advice, its influence at the agenda-setting stage, and its 
helpfulness during reform implementation. Third, in Section 
4 we employ an econometric approach to identify the factors 
that influence how development policymakers and practition-
ers evaluate Germany’s performance. Section 5 concludes by 
identifying the policy implications that follow from the major 
findings of the report.
2.
METHODOLOGY
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T
he 2014 Reform Efforts Survey is the primary source 
of data for this study. The survey was conducted by 
a team of researchers from the College of William 
& Mary in the summer of 2014 and involved the 
careful construction of a sampling frame of “individuals… 
knowledgeable about the formulation and implementation of 
government policies and programs in low- and lower-middle 
income countries at any point between 2004 and 2013” (Parks 
et al. 2015, p. 5). The research team constructed a sampling 
frame of approximately 55,000 senior policymakers and 
practitioners across five stakeholder groups: host government 
officials, development partner staff, civil society and non-gov-
ernmental organization (CSO and NGO) leaders, private 
sector representatives, and independent experts. The sampling 
frame includes individuals from 126 low- and middle-income 
countries and semi-autonomous territories who qualified for 
inclusion in the survey.8
2.1
Population of Interest and Sampling Frame
The research team that designed the survey adopted an ex-
plicit set of inclusion criteria for the sampling frame based on 
a well-defined population of interest, while at the same time 
accounting for the fact that every governmental and non-gov-
ernmental organization consists of a unique set of institutions 
and leadership positions. By identifying “functional equiva-
lents” at the institution-level and the leadership position-level, 
the research team was able to define a population of interest 
and create a sampling frame that allows for comparison across 
countries and policy areas. The specific inclusion criteria and 
procedures employed to develop this sampling frame are 
described in detail in Parks et al. (2015).
Of the 54,990 individuals originally included in the sampling 
frame, the research team successfully sent a survey invitation 
to the email inbox of more than 44,000 survey recipients. 6,731 
of the individuals who received an invitation to participate in 
the survey actually participated. The individual-level survey 
response rate was 15.3%. It is important to note that the 
survey was not designed to maximize the individual-level 
survey response rate. Rather, it was designed to maximize the 
coverage of responses across “country-policy domain pairs.”9 
The coverage rate across all possible country-policy domain 
pairs was high: out of a possible 3,024 country-policy domain 
pairs, the coverage rate is 59.9%.10
Parks et al. (2015) provide evidence that the 2014 Reform Efforts 
Survey participant sample is broadly representative of the 
population of interest on four key dimensions: sex, country, 
stakeholder group, and institution type. Unlike most surveys of 
decision-making elites in developing countries, which usually 
fail to clearly define populations of interest and collect demo-
graphic information about participants and non-participants 
in their sampling frames, the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey rests 
upon a well-defined sampling frame that enables researchers 
to analyse sample and subsample representativeness.11
2.2
Assessing Germany’s Performance as a 
Development Partner
This section describes how the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey data 
was used to analyse the policy influence and performance as 
of German development partners. Given that we are par-
ticularly interested in evaluating the perceptions of domestic 
decision-makers and stakeholders who worked directly with 
official German development actors in low- and middle-income 
countries, we exclude development partner officials and in-
dependent country experts from our analysis. After excluding 
these groups, we are left with a sample of 4,455 participants.
8 Countries are grouped according to World Bank income group designations over the period 2004-2013. For each country, we rely on the modal income group designation over the ten-year period. 
While we restrict the sample to countries that were in the low- and lower-middle-income brackets around the beginning of the ten-year period, many of these countries transitioned from one income 
bracket to another during this period of time.
9 In the survey, participants were asked to select their primary area of specialization from the following 24 different policy domains: 1) macroeconomic management; 2) finance, credit, and banking; 3) 
trade; 4) business regulatory environment; 5) investment; 6) health; 7) education; 8) family and gender; 9) social protection and welfare; 10) labor; 11) environmental protection; 12) agriculture and ru-
ral development; 13) energy and mining; 14) land; 15) infrastructure; 16) decentralization; 17) anti-corruption and transparency; 18) democracy; 19) public administration; 20) justice and security; 21) tax; 
22) customs; 23) public expenditure and management; and 24) foreign policy. If participants did not have any particular focus, they could proceed without picking any particular area of specialization.
10 See Parks et al. (2015) for more discussion on the unit-response rate across different country-policy pairs and potential non-response bias.
11 Most researchers who conduct elite survey research in the developing world resort to some form of convenience sampling—that is, they selectively choose a participant sample based upon their ease 
of access. This practice has made the scientific community appropriately sceptical of most elite survey research since it is usually not possible to examine the representativeness of the samples that are 
drawn. In this regard, the methods employed in Parks et al. (2015) represent a significant methodological improvement.
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2.2.1
Survey-Based Indicators of Germany’s Performance
We use three different survey-based indicators to measure the 
perceived performance of official German development actors 
in affecting the reform process in low- and middle-income 
countries. These indicators include: 
 • The usefulness of German policy advice provided to 
in-country policymakers and practitioners; 
 • The influence of German development cooperation on a 
partner government’s decision to pursue reforms; and
 • The helpfulness of German development cooperation 
during a partner government’s reform implementation 
efforts.  
The 2014 Reform Efforts Survey was structured in a way that 
sheds light on the role of development partners at different 
phases of reform process, from agenda setting to reform im-
plementation.12 Figure 1 graphically depicts the structure of the 
survey. Each survey participant was first asked to identify their 
areas of policy specialization and then select all development 
partners with whom they had worked directly at any point 
between 2004 and 2013. Survey participants were then asked 
to evaluate the degree to which those development partners 
provided useful policy advice and influenced the government’s 
decision to pursue specific reforms within their primary areas 
of policy specialization. Furthermore, each participant was 
asked to (a) identify the development partners involved in 
the implementation of specific partner government reform 
efforts, and (b) evaluate the extent to which each development 
partner was helpful in supporting those reform implementa-
tion efforts.13
12 The population of interest in the survey consisted of in-country stakeholders who “are knowledgeable about the formulation and implementation of government policies and programs in low- and 
middle-income countries at any point between 2004 and 2013” (Parks et al. 2015, p. 5). The sampling frame that supported the implementation of the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey is based upon a 
transparent and explicit set of inclusion criteria, which makes it possible to evaluate the representativeness of samples and subsamples vis-à-vis the sampling frame. However, given that it is practically 
impossible to identify the entire population of development policymakers and practitioners, there is some uncertainty about the representativeness of the sampling frame itself. See Parks et al. (2015) 
for further discussion of the issues associated with having an unobservable target population. 
13 While not provided with a specific definition of „reforms“, each survey participant was asked to evaluate the performance of individual development partners in assisting government efforts to solve 
specific, self-identified problems related to his or her particular area of policy expertise. For the purposes of our data analysis, we define reforms as these government efforts to solve specific policy 
problems.
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Figure 1: The Structure of the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
“Thinking of your time as [Position Title], please select all of the development partners
that you worked directly with on [policy domain] policies and programs in [Country].”
“When involved, how helpful do you think each of the following 
[selected] development partners was to the implementation of
the Government of [Country]’s [policy domain] reform efforts?”
“Please take a moment to think about any advice that you may 
have received from each of the following [selected] develop-
ment partners on issues related to [policy domain] policies and 
programs in [Country]. Approximately how often did this advice 
contain useful information about ways to address [policy domain] 
problems in [Country]?”
Participants were then asked to identify three policy
domain-specific problems that reforms tried to solve
in their country. 
“To the best of your knowledge, how much influence did each 
of the following [selected] development partners have on the 
Government of [Country]’s decision to pursue reforms
focused on these particular [policy domain] problems?”
“To the best of your knowledge, which of the following development partners were involved
in the implementation of the Government of [Country]’s [policy domain] reform efforts?”
Participants were first asked to indicate a position they held at a given organization
(with years) and select a primary area of focus out of 24 different policy domains.
Source: Authors‘ own
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2.2.2
Sampling Frame and the Sample of Survey 
Participants
Our evaluation of the performance of official German de-
velopment actors is thus based on the subsamples of survey 
participants who interacted with these organizations directly 
or indicated their involvement in reform implementation. In 
the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey, 1,227 survey participants (28% 
of the 4,455 survey participants included in the sample for this 
study) indicated that they had firsthand experience working 
with at least one of the three official German development 
actors included in the survey questionnaire —German embas-
sies, GIZ/GTZ (hereafter, we simply use GIZ to refer to both 
GIZ, which was established in 2011, and its precursor, GTZ), or 
KfW.14 Of these 1,227 survey participants, the largest number 
(911) interacted with GIZ, followed by German embassies 
(539) and KfW (405).15 There were also 585 survey participants 
(13% of all the survey participants) who identified at least 
one German development actor as having been involved in 
reform implementation, including 454 for GIZ, 172 for German 
embassies, and 159 for KfW.
The proportion of survey participants who interacted with 
GIZ, or indicated its involvement in reform implementation, 
is much higher than that for either German embassies or KfW. 
This is not particularly surprising, given the marked differences 
in size, outreach, and mandate of the three institutions.
2.2.2.1
Variation by Stakeholder Group
The subsamples used in this study are broadly representative 
of the sampling frame. Table 2-1 shows the distribution and 
number of sampling frame members, survey recipients, and 
survey participants by each of the three stakeholder groups 
analysed in this report—host government officials, CSO/NGO 
leaders, and private sector representatives. At the stakeholder 
group level, our sample of survey participants appears to be 
largely representative of the sampling frame and the cohort 
of individuals who received an email invitation to participate 
in the survey. The stakeholder group compositions of our 
subsamples—which include the 1,227 individuals who had 
direct experience working with official German development 
actors and 585 individuals who indicated German involvement 
in reform implementation—also seem to be broadly similar to 
the stakeholder group composition of the sampling frame.16
Table 2-1: The Distribution of Survey Participants, by Stakeholder Group 
 
Sampling Frame Sampling Frame Survey Sample of Survey 
Participants
Subsample of Survey 
Participants Who Interacted 
with German DPs
Subsample of Survey 
Participants Who Indicated 
German DPs’ Involvement in 
Reform Implementation
Host government 33,723 (81.6%) 3,400 (76.3%) 961 (78.3%) 446 (76.2%)
CSO/NGO 4,416 (10.7%) 737 (16.5%) 195 (15.9%) 108 (18.5%)
Private Sector 3,204 (7.8%) 318 (7.1%) 71 (5.8%) 31 (5.3%)
Total 41,343 4,455 1,227 585
14 As the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey distinguished between German embassies, GIZ, and KfW as three primary entities of official German development co-operation, we also adopted this distinction 
throughout this report. 
15 Note that survey participants were able to select multiple development partners, and some selected more than one German agency. 
16 There are some small differences between the subsamples in this study and the broad survey sample and sampling frame. Whereas 81.3% of the sampling frame consists of host government officials, 
78.3% and 76.2% of the subsamples belong to the host government stakeholder group. Also, CSO/NGO survey participants are slightly over-represented both in the survey sample and the subsamples, 
while private sector survey participants are slightly under-represented.
Source: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
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2.2.2.2
Variation by Region
The geographical scope of our sample and subsamples is 
global, drawing survey participants from all regions of the 
developing world. Table 2-2 compares the regional proportion 
of survey participants in the subsamples compared to the 
regional proportion of survey participants in the sampling 
frame and the broad survey sample.17 
As shown in Table 2-2, individuals from sub-Saharan Africa 
constitute the largest number and proportion of survey 
participants in both the broad survey sample (35% of all 4,455 
survey participants) and subsamples. In the subsamples, 35.9% 
of 1,227 survey participants indicated that they had interacted 
with official German development actors and 38.1% of survey 
participants indicated the involvement of official German 
development actors in reform implementation.
Survey participants from Europe and Central Asia and the 
Middle East and North Africa also account for relatively 
higher proportions of survey participants in the subsamples 
compared to the broader sample of survey participants. As 
reported by the BMZ (2013, p. 22), “South-Eastern Europe, 
North Africa and the Middle East continue to be particularly 
significant due to their status as neighbouring regions,” 
and the relatively high concentrations of subsample survey 
participants from these regions seem to reflect this dynamic. 
By contrast, survey participants from Latin America and the 
Caribbean are underrepresented in the subsamples. The region 
makes up 13% of the subsample that interacted with official 
German development actors and only 7% of the subsample 
that indicated the involvement of these actors in reform 
implementation (compared to 14% of the sampling frame 
and 15% of all survey participants). Similarly, slightly smaller 
proportions of subsample survey participants are from East 
Asia and the Pacific.
2.2.2.3
Variation by Policy Cluster
The 2014 Reform Efforts Survey asked participants to identify 
their primary area of focus and expertise from a list of 24 
specific policy domains.18 For the purposes of this report, these 
policy domains are aggregated to six broad policy clusters: 
macroeconomic, social, agriculture, environment, governance, 
and others.19 Figures 2 and 3 show the numbers and propor-
tions of survey participants in the subsamples, sorted by policy 
cluster. 
Table 2-2: The Distribution and Number of Sampling Frame Members, Survey Participants, and Subsamples by Region 
 
Stakeholder Group Sampling Frame Sample of Survey 
participants
Subsample of Survey par-
ticipants Who Interacted 
with German DPs
Subsample of Survey 
participants Who Indicated 
German DPs’ Involvement 
in Reform Implementation
East Asia and Pacific 5,681 (13.7%) 605 (13.6%) 117 (9.5%) 57 (9.7%)
Europe and Central Asia 6,600 (16.0%) 742 (16.7%) 245 (20.0%) 139 (23.8%)
Latin America and the Caribbean 5,813 (14.1%) 661 (14.8%) 155 (12.6%) 43 (7.4%)
Middle East and North Africa 4,132 (10.0%) 509 (11.4%) 165 (13.5%) 81 (13.9%)
South Asia 2,848 (6.9%) 392 (8.8%) 104 (8.5%) 42 (7.2%)
Sub-Saharan Africa 16,269 (39.4%) 1,546 (34.7%) 441 (35.9%) 223 (38.1%)
Total 41,343 4,455 1,227 585
 17 We adopt the World Bank regional classification (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups).
18 See footnote 10 for details on what constitute these 24 different policy domains.
19 See Appendix A for more details on how the 24 different policy domains are reclassified into the six broader categories.
Source: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
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Survey participants with specialization in the issues of 
governance make up the largest group in both of the different 
subsamples, comprising 23% of survey participants (269) 
who interacted with official German development actors 
and 25% of survey participants (114) who indicated German 
involvement in reform implementation. The second largest 
group in the subsample consists of individuals who focused on 
macroeconomic issues. These survey participants constitute 
17% and 19% of the subsamples, respectively. Individuals with 
a specialization in agriculture constitute the smallest group 
in both subsamples.20 The sectoral composition of survey 
participants in the subsamples largely mirrors that of the 
overall participant sample.21
Figures 2 and 3 further disaggregate survey participants by the 
specific German development actors with which they interact-
ed or which they reported to be involved in reform implemen-
tation. Within each of the policy clusters, we find a relatively 
high proportion of survey participants who interacted with 
GIZ or indicated the institution’s involvement in helping the 
implementation of policy reforms. This situation seems to 
reflect the broad and extensive scope of GIZ’s development 
activities in the field. By contrast, KfW is mainly responsible 
for financial cooperation by making loans and grants available 
and providing personnel support for development projects, 
and it does not have as large of a field presence as GIZ (OECD-
DAC 2001b). 
German embassies, in turn, serve not only as diplomatic 
liaisons, but also engage in direct policy dialogue with host 
government officials and development cooperation planning 
activities. Yet, their areas of engagement were traditionally 
focused more on political issues and high-level policy dialogue 
(OECD 2001b). This may explain why the proportion of 
participants who interacted with German embassies is some-
what higher among those survey participants who served in 
high-ranking government positions and/or devoted a greater 
share of their time to political matters.22
As the above analysis shows, there is significant variation in 
the sample size across geographical regions and/or across 
policy clusters. This variation derives in part from different 
response rates and the availability of contact information 
across countries and policy areas (Parks et al. 2015, p. 5). Unless 
otherwise stated, we therefore employ the same weighting 
scheme as developed and described in Parks et al. (2015), which 
gives equal weight to every policy cluster in every country to 
compute aggregate statistics as a means to alleviate potential 
bias arising from “variation in contact availability, country 
sample size, and participation rates”  (Ibid., p. 5).23
20 As shown in Appendix A, individuals who chose foreign policy or did not have any particular area of focus are categorized in “Others.” 
21 In the overall sample of survey participants, 28% of participants are from the policy cluster of “governance”, 20% from “macroeconomic”, 18% from “social”, 9% from “agriculture”, 7% from “environ-
ment,” and 17% from “others.” 
22 It was only recently that the embassies were formally tasked with leading the sector-policy dialogue in partner countries, which until then had been led by the implementing agencies (see Box 1). In 
Table A 2 in the Appendix, we offer an analysis of the composition of participants who interacted with German embassies to shed light on what types of participants are likely to work with them as a 
development partner. Our analysis reveals that those survey participants who spent a greater share of their time working on political issues or served in high-ranking government positions were more 
likely to interact with German embassies.
23 See Appendix C in Parks et al. (2015) for more details on how these weights are computed.
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Figure 2: The Distribution of Survey Participants Who Interacted Directly with Official German Development Actors, by 
Policy Cluster
Figure 3: The Distribution of Survey Participants Who Indicated German Development Actor Involvement in Reform 
Implementation, by Policy Cluster
Source: 2014 Reform
Efforts Survey
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2.3
Limitations
There are several limitations imposed by this particular type of 
data and analysis. First, it is important to bear in mind that the 
survey is focused on the performance of external development 
partners as it relates to the usefulness of policy advice that 
they provide, the influence that they exert on partner country 
priorities, and their helpfulness during the implementation 
of reforms. This study does not consider the full range of 
international development cooperation activities supported by 
German and non-German aid agencies. 
Second, our measure of development partner performance is 
based on the experience-based perceptions of survey partici-
pants, which may or may not directly correlate with the actual 
contributions of development partners to reform progress or 
success, and thus should be interpreted as such.24 Also, the 
evidence presented in this study should not be equated with 
the actual effectiveness of German development cooperation. 
It represents one – admittedly important – perspective on this 
issue.
Third, is should be noted that some of the terms used in 
the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey are (deliberately) open to 
interpretation. This applies in particular to the use of the 
term “reform”. Instead of providing participants with a specific 
definition of the term, the survey asked each participant 
to evaluate the performance of individual development 
actors in assisting government efforts to solve specific, 
self-identified problems related to his or her particular area of 
policy expertise. While this approach should not present any 
particular analytical challenge in the context of this study (as 
we are interested precisely in understanding the perceived 
usefulness, agenda-setting influence, and helpfulness of 
development partners pertaining to specific issues identified 
by participants), it does imply that different stakeholders may 
have interpreted the term “reform” in different ways, which 
could range from institutional and legal reforms to specific 
policies and regulations.
Fourth, and importantly for Germany, given the nature of the 
survey (which was focused on generating comparative data 
for nearly 100 development partners), the questionnaire did 
not attempt to account for all of the particular attributes, 
objectives, and potential impacts of Germany’s development 
cooperation. Consequently, not all questions that would 
arise with regard to the specific strengths and weaknesses of 
German aid can be fully investigated with the available data. 
The survey, for instance, did not ask participants about their 
experiences, observations, or perceptions related to German 
political foundations, non-governmental organizations, 
or think tanks, which may play a critical role in the reform 
processes of partner countries. We therefore cannot conduct 
a comparative analysis of all German institutions that could 
plausibly affect reform processes in partner countries. 
Fifth and finally, the period covered by the survey (2004-2013) 
mostly predates important institutional reforms within the 
German aid system, such as the merger of former DED, 
InWEnt, and GTZ into GIZ, or the increased staffing of 
embassies. This means that the findings do not necessarily 
reflect the state of affairs at the time of publication of this 
report. However, the results still provide a valuable picture of 
perceptions of German aid from a partner country perspective 
during a crucial period of the global development agenda. 
They also constitute a valuable baseline to evaluate the effects 
of these institutional changes in future analysis (once AidData 
has conducted additional waves of the survey).
24 Encouragingly, we do find a positive and statistically significant relationship between AidData’s survey measure of reform progress from 2004-2013 (see Figure 39 in Parks et al. 2015) and an indepen-
dently generated measure of reform progress (the average rate of change in the World Bank’s CPIA scores during the same period).
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HOW DO GERMAN
DEVELOPMENT ACTORS 
MEASURE UP? 
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T
he reform process consists of different stages. It 
begins with setting reform priorities. The authorities 
must then design and initiate reforms, and eventually 
governments must shepherd reforms to completion 
and ensure their long-run sustainability. As policymakers in 
low- and lower-middle income nations negotiate this complex 
and non-linear process, they often turn to external devel-
opment partners for advice and assistance. This market for 
external sources of reform advice and assistance is increasing-
ly competitive (Parks et al. 2015; Custer et al. 2015). Indeed, a 
growing number of development partners vie “for influence 
over the policies of … recipient government[s]” (Archarya et 
al. 2006, p. 7; Anderson 2012; Kimura et al. 2012; Frot & Santiso 
2010; Knack & Rahman 2007). 
In this section, we explore how official German development 
actors are positioned in this increasingly competitive mar-
ketplace. Specifically, we evaluate the performance of official 
German development actors by analysing how participants of 
the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey perceive: (1) the usefulness of 
their policy advice; (2) their level of influence that they exert 
on government officials’ decision to pursue policy reforms; and 
(3) their helpfulness during reform implementation. Collective-
ly, these three indicators allow us to measure the performance 
of Germany’s development actors as perceived by various 
in-country stakeholders at different stages of reform process. 
Moreover, as these three indicators are comparable across 
different development partners, policy clusters, and countries, 
this analysis allows us to assess how German actors perform in 
comparison to other development partners and to identify the 
comparative strengths of official German development actors 
in influencing or helping reform efforts in low- and middle-in-
come countries. 
3.1
How Do German Development Actors Stack Up 
Vis-à-Vis Their Peers?
We identify two general patterns by analysing the experi-
ence-based perceptions of German development actors and 
comparing their performance to that of other development 
partners:
First, contrary to what one might expect, survey partici-
pants do not perceive a clear division of roles and respon-
sibilities between the three official German development 
actors with respect to the support that they provide at 
different stages of the reform process in partner countries. 
Given the specific setup of the German aid system in which 
embassies take the lead on political issues in partner countries 
while implementation support is delegated mainly to GIZ and 
KfW, one might expect a pattern by which German embassies 
are perceived more useful at the policy advice provision 
and agenda-setting stages and implementing agencies are 
perceived to be more helpful at the implementation stage. 
In fact, survey participants reported GIZ to be, on average, a 
higher-performing development partner in comparison to KfW 
and German embassies at all stages of the reform process, i.e., 
providing more useful policy advice, exerting more influence 
on reform priorities, and providing more helpful assistance 
during reform implementation.
Second, German development actors generally (with 
some exceptions for GIZ and German embassies) do not 
perform significantly better or worse than the average DAC 
bilateral development partner. The same finding applies to 
other large bilateral development partners, such as the UK’s 
DFID and USAID, which do not perform significantly better 
or worse than the DAC average with one important exception 
being France’s Agence Française de Développement (AFD). 
By contrast, survey participants gave relatively high marks 
to large multilateral organizations and small and yet highly 
specialized development partners (such as vertical funds) 
on three different indicators of donor performance: policy 
advice usefulness, agenda-setting influence, and helpfulness 
in reform implementation. Among the top-rated bilateral 
development partners are those that are relatively small in 
size and yet have a clear geographical or developmental focus, 
including some of the major Nordic donor agencies such as the 
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA).
3.1.1
How Useful is Germany’s Policy Advice?
Does the policy advice provided by official German develop-
ment actors contain useful information for policymakers and 
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practitioners in low- and middle-income countries? Critics 
argue that there are often discrepancies between the policy 
preferences of development partners and partner countries 
(e.g., Altaf 2011; Moyo 2010; Van de Walle 2001). Also, in spite 
of the principles espoused in the 2005 Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness, there are still lingering issues related 
to donors aligning their objectives with those of partner 
countries (Dijkstra 2013). The prescriptions of development 
partners sometimes fail to take into account local context, 
thereby undermining country ownership and host government 
commitment to reform (World Bank 2001, p. 191; Andrews 
2013). Thus, the perspectives of in-country stakeholders are 
particularly important in determining whether development 
partners provide advice that is regarded as useful, which in 
turn has direct bearing on the reform process and downstream 
reform outcomes.
To this end, the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey asked survey 
participants to indicate—on a scale of 1 to 5—how often the 
advice provided by a development partner contained useful in-
formation.25 A score of 1 indicated that advice contained useful 
information almost never, a score of 2 indicated that advice was 
useful less than half the time, a score of 3 indicated that advice 
was useful about half the time, a score of 4 indicated that 
advice was useful more than half the time, and a 5 indicated 
that advice was useful almost always.26 Figure 4 rank-orders 
the top 10 development partners (out of 86) as well as German 
embassies, GIZ, and KfW based on their average scores in 
terms of the usefulness of their policy advice.27 The figure also 
shows whether the average scores of usefulness for German 
development actors as well as the top ten most useful devel-
opment partners are significantly different from the overall 
average score of DAC bilaterals (using asterisks to indicate 
statistical significance).28
GIZ received a score of 3.43 out of 5 on the usefulness of 
its advice, ranking 17th out of 86 development partners on 
this measure. GIZ’s performance therefore sits within the 
highest quartile of all the development partners included 
in the analysis. Survey participants, on average, found policy 
advice provided by GIZ to be useful more than half the time. 
They also, on average, found GIZ’s policy advice to contain 
useful information more often than policy advice provided by 
an average DAC bilateral development partner.29 
By comparison, KfW and German embassies received scores 
that placed them within the second highest quartile of 
development partners included in this analysis (with scores 
of 3.07 and 2.93, respectively). These scores indicate that 
survey participants perceive German embassy and KfW policy 
advice to be useful, on average, about half of the time. 
One potential reason why GIZ may be perceived to be a more 
valuable source of advisory services among the three German 
development actors is that GIZ enjoys an extensive field pres-
ence, which is unmatched by KfW and German embassies. GIZ 
also provides purportedly demand-driven technical assistance 
to its partner countries at various stages of the policymaking 
process (OECD-DAC 2001a, p. 52).30 Indeed, as we will show in 
our descriptive analysis, GIZ also consistently outperformed 
German embassies, KfW, and an average DAC bilateral 
donor on the other two development partner performance 
indicators.
25 This question was asked only to host government officials and thus not applicable to CSO/NGO leaders or private sector representatives.
26 It is important to note that the usefulness of policy advice measures the frequency with which given policy advice was found useful, not the degree to which given advice was found useful.
27 See Figures B.1 in Appendix B for a full report on the average scores of usefulness for all 86 development partners included in the analysis. To ensure that our estimated averages are not derived from 
only a few observations, we drop all those development partners for which the number of observations did not exceed 10, which reduces the number of development partners included in the analysis 
from 96 to 86. 
28 We compute the overall DAC bilateral average by averaging the score of all DAC donors excluding German development actors. We use the same calculation in computing the DAC bilateral average 
of policy advice usefulness, agenda-setting influence, and helpfulness during reform implementation throughout the report.
29 GIZ’s average score on this indicator is significantly higher than the overall DAC bilateral average score of 3.17 (p<0.01).
30 At the same time, it should be noted that a separate analysis of the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey has demonstrated that when donor governments channel a disproportionate amount of aid to their 
partner countries via technical assistance, they usually have less sway with the authorities (Custer et al. 2015). This finding is somewhat surprising given that most technical assistance programs are 
advisory in nature. It may reflect the fact that many technical assistance programs are not tailored to the needs and interests of partner countries.
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Notes: Scores are computed based on responses from those survey participants who indicated their first-hand experience working with a given development partner and evaluated its policy advice 
usefulness (See Figure 1 for details on the structure of the survey). The number of participants who evaluated a given development partner in the survey is reported in brackets next to the name of the 
donor while the rankings of German development partners are reported in brackets next to their scores. We excluded those development partners for which the number of participants did not exceed 
the threshold of 10, which reduced the number of development partners included in the ranking from 96 to 86. Difference-in-means tests are conducted to evaluate whether German development 
actors and the top 10 performers have scores that are statistically different from the average scores of DAC bilateral development partners. Asterisks indicate statistical significance: ***p<0.01; 
**p<0.05; *p<0.10.
At the same time, it is worth noting that some of the devel-
opment partners that provided the most useful policy advice 
are small in organizational size and have a narrowly-defined 
sectoral focus. For instance, the Global Alliance for Vaccines 
and Immunization (GAVI) and the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria received the first and third 
highest scores of policy advice usefulness (4.04 and 3.93, 
respectively). There are at least three possible reasons why 
these development partners performed particularly well 
on this indicator of policy advice usefulness. First, both 
development partners put an emphasis on country ownership, 
working closely with host governments to integrate new 
programs into the existing health systems.31 This model likely 
enables GAVI and the Global Fund to provide tailored and 
demand-driven advice to their partner countries (GAVI 2011; 
Sherry et al. 2009). Second and relatedly, both organizations 
administer performance-based financing programs that are 
designed to give domestic reformers in the countries where 
31 As Parks et al. (2015, p. 109) note, the GAVI and the Global Fund employ pay-for-performance programs, which promote the idea of country ownership by “endow[ing] governments with the policy 
autonomy and manoeuvrability that they need to experiment, iteratively adapt, and ‘crawl the design space’ in pursuit of deep and durable reform.” 
Figure 4: Policy Advice Usefulness of the Ten Most Useful Development Partners, German Development Partners, and the 
Average DAC Bilateral
Source: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
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they work the autonomy and manoeuvrability needed to 
determine how best to initiate successfully implement reforms 
(Parks et al. 2015). Inasmuch as these programs generate local 
demand for analytical and advisory inputs that can inform 
domestic reform processes, they may enable GAVI and the 
Global Fund to provide relatively more demand-driven policy 
advice in comparison to aid agencies that rely less heavily 
on performance-based funding mechanisms.  Third, GAVI 
and the Global Fund possess expertise in the health sector 
and work almost exclusively in this sector, which is relevant 
because sector specialization matters and the health sector in 
particular has a rich tradition of evidence-based policymaking 
that may render host government recipients more amenable 
to external sources of advice.32 
Other development partners that performed relatively well on 
this measure of policy advice usefulness include large, bilateral 
and multilateral agencies with a global reach (e.g., the World 
Bank and the IMF). Somewhat smaller European bilateral 
development partners, many of whom provide general 
budget support as a means to achieve some degree of policy 
influence, also fared well on this measure (Del Biondo & Orbie 
2014; Del Biondo 2015).
3.1.2
How Influential is Germany in Setting the Reform 
Agenda?
Another stage of the policymaking process where develop-
ment partners can exert influence is in the agenda-setting 
stage where policymakers are choosing which reforms to 
pursue. The 2014 Reform Efforts Survey asked participants to 
identify the level of influence that individual development 
partners had on a given government’s decision to pursue 
specific, participant-identified, reforms (without specifying 
the mechanisms by which this influence was exerted). Survey 
participants assigned scores on a scale from 0 (no influence 
at all) to 5 (maximum influence). Figure 5 compares the official 
German development actors against the top 10 development 
partners (out of 87) and other DAC bilaterals by level of 
agenda-setting influence.33
Once again, GIZ received the highest agenda-setting 
influence score (2.42) among all three German develop-
ment actors, positioning it in the second highest quartile 
of the 87 development partners included in this analysis. 
GIZ’s score is slightly higher than the average agenda-setting 
influence score for DAC bilaterals (2.31), indicating that survey 
participants perceived GIZ to be more influential in shaping 
reform priorities than the average development partner. 
German embassies and KfW also registered scores in the 
second highest quartile of development partners (with 
scores of 2.17 and 2.12), though these scores are slightly lower 
than the average DAC bilateral score (2.31). Additionally, we 
find that large multilateral development partners, such as the 
World Bank (3.30), Inter-American Development Bank (3.21), 
IMF (3.20), and EU (3.04), were perceived to be particularly 
influential in initiating the reform process.34 These results 
are consistent with a central claim from the supranational 
delegation literature: that states yield authority to inter-gov-
ernmental organizations because they enjoy higher levels of 
perceived credibility and neutrality and serve as more author-
itative and influential sources of analysis and advice (Hawkins 
et. al. 2006).35 
32 A number of scholars (e.g., Ungar 2010; Kharas 2009; Easterly & Pfutze 2008; Acharya et al. 2006) argue that sectoral and country specialization is essential for development partners to work more 
effectively with their partner countries.
33 See Figure B.2 in Appendix B for a full report on the average scores of agenda-setting influence for all 87 development partners.
34 In the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey, no distinction was made between the European Union as a supranational organization and the European Commission as a distinctive executive entity. It is likely 
that when participants evaluated the European Union as a whole, they were primarily evaluating the role of the European Commission and its engagement with host countries.
35 One reason bilateral policy advice may lack influence is a lack of perceived credibility on the part of the adviser. Research and experience suggest that when a government’s role as a “ruthless truth-
teller” comes into conflict with countervailing (geostrategic, diplomatic, or commercial) interests and pressures, its credibility may be undermined and its policy influence weakened (Stone 2004; Parks 
2014). For example, after providing significant financial support in exchange for use of airspace over Turkey, the U.S. Government effectively delegated responsibility for surveillance of Turkey’s policy 
performance to the IMF. The IMF assumed this monitoring role because they were regarded as neutral, credible, and technically proficient third-party that could more effectively pressure the Turkish 
authorities to remain fiscally disciplined (Momani 2007).
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Notes: Scores are computed based on responses from those survey participants who indicated their first-hand experience working with a given development partner and evaluated its agenda-setting 
influence (See Figure 1 for details on the structure of the survey). The number of participants who evaluated a given development partner in the survey is reported in brackets next to the name of the 
donor while the rankings of German development partners are reported in brackets next to their scores in the figure. We excluded those development partners for which the number of participants 
did not exceed the threshold of 10, which reduced the number of development partners included in the ranking from 97 to 87. Difference-in-means tests are conducted to evaluate whether German 
development actors and the top 10 performers have scores that are statistically different from the average scores of DAC bilateral development partners. Asterisks indicate statistical significance: 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
Figure 5: Agenda-Setting Influence of the Ten Most Influential Development Partners, German Development Partners, and 
the Average DAC Bilateral
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3.1.3
How Helpful is German Development Cooperation 
During Reform Implementation?
There is an active debate about whether or not development 
partner involvement during the implementation of reforms 
will lead to higher or lower levels of reform success. One camp 
argues that development partners can effectively alter the 
cost-benefit calculus of reform for developing country leaders 
– for example, by lowering the costs that are incurred in the 
design and implementation of reform (Jacoby 2006; Helmke 
& McLean 2014; Krasner 2011). Another camp proposes that 
governments must protect their domestic policy autonomy 
and manoeuvrability if they wish to achieve deep and durable 
reform, as external pressures from development partners may 
promote “best practice” and “blueprint” reforms that are not 
fit for local purpose (Evans 2004; Booth 2011a; Pritchett et al. 
2013; Andrews 2011, 2013).
The 2014 Reform Efforts Survey asked participants to estimate 
the degree to which development partners helped partner 
country counterparts successfully implement reforms on a 
scale from 0 (not at all helpful) to 5 (extremely helpful). Using 
this indicator, Figure 6 lists the top 10 development partners 
(out of 72) and presents the rankings of German development 
actors and an average DAC bilateral development partner.36 
GIZ received the highest score (3.22) among the German 
development actors, followed by KfW (3.18) and German 
embassies (2.88). GIZ and KfW both registered scores that 
fall within the second highest quartile of the 72 develop-
ment partners included in our analysis of this question. By 
contrast, German embassies registered a level of perfor-
mance that placed them in the second lowest quartile. They 
also performed significantly less well (at p<0.05) than the 
average DAC bilateral development partner (3.16).37 
Similar to our other findings on advice usefulness and 
agenda-setting influence, several organizations with high 
levels of sectoral specialization—such as GAVI (3.86), the 
Global Environment Facility (3.58), the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (3.57), and the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (3.51)—were among the 
highest scoring development partners. Sectoral specialization 
has been cited as a key factor that improves the quality and 
effectiveness of development cooperation (Ungar 2010; Kharas 
2009; Easterly & Pfutze 2008; Archarya et al. 2006); thus, the 
clear, narrow sectoral focus of these development partners 
may enhance their ability to effectively assist partner coun-
tries during the implementation of their reform efforts.
It is also worth mentioning that survey participants regarded 
Swedish embassies to be among the most helpful development 
partners during reform implementation. Although the underly-
ing factors that account for this pattern are not entirely clear, 
one potential explanation may be that Sweden has concen-
trated their development resources and efforts in a few select 
sectors and countries. This narrow focus may enable them to 
develop close working relationships with policymakers within 
those sectors and countries. Indeed, Sweden has traditionally 
devoted a disproportionate amount of development finance 
to a small number of partner countries “which it had know-
ledge of or ideological association with, or both” (Danielson 
& Wohlgemuth 2005, p. 542). Swedish development partners 
have also been known for working “in a limited number of 
sectors in which [they have] experience and expertise” (Ibid.). 
36 See Figure B.3 in Appendix B for a full report on the average scores of reform implementation helpfulness for all 72 development partners.
37 While this finding is in line with the presumably limited nature of German embassies’ involvement in reform implementation, it is noteworthy that some 334 participants to the survey that pre-dates 
this reform indicated that the German embassy in their country had been involved in reform implementation.
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Notes: Scores are computed based on responses from those survey participants who indicated a given development partner’s involvement in reform implementation and evaluated its helpfulness at the 
implementation stage (See Figure 1 for details on the structure of the survey). The number of participants who evaluated a given development partner in the survey is reported in brackets next to the 
name of the development partner while the rankings of German development partners are reported in brackets next to their scores in the figure. We excluded those development partners for which 
the number of participants did not exceed the threshold of 10, which reduced the number of development partners included in the ranking from 89 to 72. Difference-in-means tests are conducted to 
evaluate whether German development actors and the top 10 performers have scores that are statistically different from the average scores of DAC bilateral development partners. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
Figure 6: Reform Implementation Helpfulness of the Ten Most Helpful Development Partners, German Development 
Partners, and the Average DAC Bilateral
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3.2
Comparative Strengths of Germany’s Development 
Actors 
Figure 7 shows the perceived level of policy advice usefulness, 
agenda-setting influence, and helpfulness in reform implemen-
tation of various German development actors, as compared to 
other major DAC bilateral donor agencies—namely, the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the UK’s Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID), the Agence 
Française de Développement (AFD), the Embassies of the 
Netherlands, Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA), the Norwegian Agency for Development Coop-
eration (NORAD), and the Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA)—as well as the World Bank, the EU, and the 
overall average of DAC bilateral donors (excluding German 
development partners). 
Although GIZ consistently ranked as the top performer 
among German development actors and it performed well 
in relation to some other DAC bilateral agencies (e.g., 
USAID, JICA), the major multilateral donors included in this 
analysis—the EU and the World Bank—outperformed GIZ 
on all three dimensions of development partner perfor-
mance. The World Bank, in particular, scored consistently and 
substantially higher than the overall DAC average and other 
major DAC bilateral donor agencies in terms of usefulness 
of its policy advice (with a score of 3.72), its agenda-setting 
influence (3.30), and its helpfulness in reform implementation 
(3.54). These findings cannot be easily explained by “ground 
game” (i.e., field presence) differences between GIZ, on one 
hand, and the EU and the World Bank (Parks et al. 2015). GIZ 
has approximately 17,000 employees, and approximately 80 
percent of its employees work abroad. The World Bank, by 
contrast, has some 12,000 employees. 
It is also notable that, in spite of the limited size and 
scope of their activities, some of the Nordic development 
organizations—in particular, DANIDA—performed relative-
ly well compared to much larger DAC bilateral development 
actors. These findings are consistent with the prevailing belief 
that “the Nordic countries are ‘punching far beyond their 
weight in international arenas’” (Selbervik and Nygaard 2006, 
p. 15).38 Nordic donors are distinguished from other donors 
by the strong priority they assign to “developmental and 
humanitarian needs of developing countries” over their own 
self-interests (Harrigan & Wang 2011, p. 1285). Minoiu & Reddy 
(2010) show that the development aid from Scandinavian 
countries is particularly effective in promoting economic 
growth in comparison to development aid from other DAC 
development partners. 
Our findings corroborate these claims. Nordic donor agencies 
perform comparably to, or even better than, some of the other 
major donor agencies on our three dimensions of perfor-
mance: policy advice usefulness, agenda-setting influence, and 
helpfulness in reform implementation.
38 Custer et al. (2015) provide evidence that small, DAC bilateral donors tend to punch above their weight.
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Notes: Each dot in the figure corresponds to the estimated average scores of advice usefulness, agenda-setting influence, and helpfulness for German embassies, GIZ, KfW, USAID, JICA, DFID, AFD, 
the Netherlands, SIDA, NORAD, DANIDA, the EU, and the World Bank, while horizontal bars around each point estimate correspond to 95% confidence intervals. The dashed grey lines represent the 
overall average scores of the DAC bilaterals (excluding German development partners). 
Figure 7: Policy Advice Usefulness, Agenda-Setting Influence, and Helpfulness in Reform Implementation: A Comparison 
between German Development Actors, the Average DAC Bilateral, and Select Bilateral and Multilateral Agencies
3.3
Does Germany Punch Above or Below Its Financial 
Weight?
Custer et al. (2015) report that a development partner’s 
financial weight (as measured by the volume of its internation-
al development finance commitments) is one key factor that 
determines the degree to which it can exert influence at the 
agenda-setting stage of a partner country’s reform process. 
Following the same methodology used in Custer et al. (2015), 
we have calculated a Value for Money index (using the sample 
described in section 2.2.2 of this study) for a selection of major 
bilateral and multilateral development partners to assess 
which development partners punch above or below their 
financial weight.39 Figure 8 suggests that large multilateral 
and supranational donors, such as the World Bank and the EU, 
exerted greater-than-expected agenda-setting influence, while 
the five largest DAC bilateral donors (US, UK, Germany, Japan, 
and France) all punch below their financial weight.40 
There are a number of potential reasons why multilateral 
development partners may enjoy a policy influence advantage 
vis-à-vis their bilateral counterparts. One reason is that these 
institutions usually possess significant technical expertise and 
39 Custer et al. (2015) construct a Value for Money index by first regressing the natural log of average annual development finance commitments contributed by each of the 46 different development 
partners on their scores of agenda-setting influence, and then computing standardized residuals from this regression as an indicator of the extent to which each donor punches above or below their 
financial weight. The same data are used here to generate our Value for Money index presented in Figure 8. However, it is important to note that the ranking of development partners presented in this 
study differs slightly from Custer et al.’s because, in computing the agenda-setting influence scores we have limited the scope of our analysis to in-country stakeholder groups (e.g., host government 
officials, CSO/NGO leaders, and private sector representatives).  Custer et al. (2015) draw on a broader sample that includes development partner staff, which account for roughly 20% of the partici-
pants in the original sample.
40 It is also notable that Nordic donors, on average, seem to exert a level of influence that is greater-than-expected based on their relatively small aid budgets.
Source: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
Usefulness of Policy Advice Agenda Setting Influence Helpfulness in Reform Implementation
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USAID [984,113] USAID [1221,117] USAID [865,103]
JICA [703,112] JICA [750,114] JICA [394,90]
DFID [495,78] DFID [603,83] DFID [405,61]
AFD [331,77] AFD [378,82] AFD [209,52]
Netherlands [107,37] Netherlands [159,45] Netherlands [114,41]
SIDA [125,36] SIDA [173,45] SIDA [105,34]
NORAD [35,12] NORAD [45,14] NORAD [23,12]
DANIDA [57,19] DANIDA [67,23] DANIDA [52,20]
EU [1155,119] EU [1402,121] EU [1082,119]
World Bank [1487,122] World Bank [1643,121] World Bank [11461,118]
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many of them have prioritized the provision of high-quality 
analytical and advisory services (Ravallion & Wagstaff 2012; 
IMF 2013). Another reason is that multilateral institutions 
are less subject to geopolitical, commercial, and diplomatic 
interests than their bilateral counterparts, which may render 
their reform advice and assistance more credible and neutral 
in the eyes of partner government officials (Hawkins et al. 
2006; Parks et al. 2015).41 
While there is significant variation across donors in terms 
of the extent to which they convert financial contributions 
into actual policy influence, these topline measures of donor 
performance beg a deeper question: do individual develop-
ment partners have comparative strengths or weaknesses 
in particular sectors? In response to international calls for 
increased aid efficiency and effectiveness (United Nations 
2008; Booth 2011b), Germany has narrowed its areas of 
focus to fewer sectors in an effort to enable more intensive, 
sectoral cooperation with its partner countries; specifically, 
it has decided to focus on 11 particular sectors (OECD-DAC 
2010, p. 33; BMZ 2008a).42 This effort to “double down” in a 
limited number of sectors is consistent with broader efforts by 
international development actors to pursue greater sectoral 
41 This latter argument does not hold in the case of the European Union, which – as a supranational body – has important commercial and geopolitical interests of its own.
42 These 11 policy areas include the following: 1) “democracy,” 2) “peace-building and crisis prevention,” 3) “education,” 4) “health,” 5) “water,” 6) “food security and agriculture,” 7)” environment policy, 
protection and sustainable use of natural resources,” 8) “sustainable economic development,” 9) “energy,” 10) “transport and communication,” and 11) “regional concentration in the framework of in-
tegrated rural or urban development” (OECD-DAC 2010, p. 33). The Coalition Agreement of October 2009 further narrows the list of key development priorities of German development co-operation 
to the following seven policy areas: “good governance; education; health; protection of climate, environment and natural resources; rural development; private sector development; and sustainable 
economic development” (Ibid, p. 13-14).
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Figure 8: The Value for Money Index for Major Multilateral and Bilateral Donors
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(and regional) specialization and a better-defined division of 
labour (Nunnenkamp et al. 2015). 
The 2014 Reform Efforts Survey allows us to analyse the policy 
areas in which survey participants considered German devel-
opment partners to be particularly effective in providing useful 
advice, influential in setting a reform agenda, and/or helpful 
in assisting efforts to successfully implement reforms. We find 
that Germany was perceived to have performed particularly 
well among those survey participants whose policy area of 
expertise was the environment. In no other policy area does 
Germany consistently outperform an average DAC develop-
ment partner. Importantly, despite the primacy of governance 
as one of the key priorities of German development strategy, 
we do not find evidence that survey participants with policy 
expertise in the issues of governance perceived Germany 
particularly favourably compared to participants in the other 
policy clusters. 
3.3.1
Accessibility and Engagement: Frequency of 
Interaction and Involvement in Implementation, by 
Policy Cluster
We use data from the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey to explore the 
comparative strengths of German development partners in 
different policy clusters: namely, macroeconomic, social, agri-
culture, environment, and governance.43 Figure 9 presents the 
percentage of survey participants who interacted with German 
development actors by policy cluster. The figure also shows 
the proportion of survey participants who interacted with the 
EU and an average DAC bilateral development partner as a 
comparison group. 
The EU interacted with the highest proportion of survey 
participants – roughly half of all survey participants in each 
policy cluster. Given the relatively large size and scope of 
the EU’s organizational capacities compared to other major 
bilateral development partners, these findings do not come as 
a great surprise (EU 2014). 
Among the three German development actors, GIZ interacted 
with the highest proportion of survey participants in each 
policy cluster (24% averaged across the policy clusters). The 
corresponding numbers for German embassies and KfW are 
significantly lower. This is likely due to their different roles as 
well as their comparatively small field presence. In each policy 
cluster, the percentage of survey participants who interacted 
with GIZ is higher than the percentage of survey participants 
who worked with an average DAC bilateral development 
partner; in contrast, lower percentages of survey participants 
interacted with KfW and German embassies than with an aver-
age non-German DAC bilateral in most of the policy clusters.
Figure 9 also reveals substantial variation in the degree of 
interaction with development partners by policy cluster (i.e., 
area of expertise). The proportions of survey participants 
who interacted with GIZ (35%) or KfW (17%) were the 
highest among those whose area of expertise focused on 
environmental issues (e.g., environmental protection and 
energy and mining). These percentages are much higher than 
the corresponding numbers for survey participants in the 
other policy clusters. 
These findings seem to closely align with the strategic 
priorities of German development cooperation during 
the period covered by the survey, which put a particular 
emphasis on environmental protection (e.g., climate change, 
local environmental issues, and renewable energy) (Hicks 
et al. 2008; BMZ 2011; KfW 2011). In particular, Germany has 
played a leading role in “mainstreaming climate change issues 
into development cooperation” (Nabiyeva 2011, p. 1), and in 
recent years climate protection has gained greater weight in 
Germany’s development cooperation, “with BMZ’s climate 
related expenditure increasing by 40% between 2008 and 
2009” (OECD-DAC 2010, p. 90).44 Furthermore, German aid 
commitments earmarked for the issues of “biodiversity and 
forest protection [have] risen continuously since the last 
[2005] Peer Review from EUR 124 million in 2005 to EUR 210 
million in 2009” (Ibid.). 
43 See Appendix A for the definitions of these policy clusters.
44 Projects related to climate change accounted for “around one third of GIZ’s entire portfolio [emphasis added]” in 2014 (GIZ 2014).
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Notably, Figure 9 reveals that relatively few of the survey 
participants who interacted directly with KfW and GIZ 
identified governance as their primary area of specializa-
tion. By contrast, among those individuals who interacted 
directly with German embassies, a relatively large propor-
tion identified governance as their area of specialization 
(15%).45 These findings raise the question of whether, to 
what extent, and how German embassies and GIZ offices are 
working together in coordinated and complementary ways to 
promote governance reform.46 
Figure 10 shows, by policy cluster, the percentage of survey 
participants who indicated the involvement of German de-
velopment actors, an average DAC development partner, and 
the EU in reform implementation efforts. The figure exhibits a 
pattern akin to what we observed in Figure 9. In each policy 
cluster, the proportion of survey participants indicating EU 
involvement in reform implementation efforts was signif-
icantly higher than for other development partners (40% 
across all the policy clusters). 
45 By way of comparison, the corresponding numbers for survey participants in the other policy clusters were: 15% in the macroeconomic policy cluster, 14% in the environmental policy cluster, 11% in 
the agricultural policy cluster, and 10% in the social policy cluster. 
46 Custer et al. (2015), for example, report that “The U.S … seems to have established a de facto division of labour in the area of democratic reform:  U.S. embassies and USAID missions both provide de-
mocracy reform advice that is regarded as very useful by host government counterparts; however, U.S. embassies are perceived to be most influential at the agenda-setting stage and USAID missions 
are perceived [by host government counterparts] to be most helpful during the reform implementation stage.”
Figure 9: The Proportion of Survey Participants Who Interacted with German Development Partners, by Policy Cluster
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We also observe significant variation across the different 
German development actors in terms of their reported level of 
involvement in reform implementation efforts. Approximately 
17% of survey participants, averaged across different 
policy clusters, indicated that GIZ was involved in reform 
implementation efforts. Far fewer indicated that German 
embassies and KfW were involved in reform implementa-
tion efforts (7%). 
 
The percentages of survey participants who indicated 
German development partner involvement in reform imple-
mentation efforts are particularly high among those with 
environmental policy expertise (30% for GIZ; 15% for KfW, 
and 12% for German embassies, respectively). By contrast, 
the percentage of participants who attested to German 
development actor involvement in reform implementation 
efforts was comparatively lower among individuals with 
governance expertise. This pattern is particularly visible 
for GIZ and KfW (10% for GIZ; 1% for KfW), and it is similar 
to what we observed in Figure 9 where the proportions of 
participants who interacted with German development actors 
were more (or less) pronounced in the environmental policy 
cluster (or governance).
Figure 10: The Percentage of Survey Participants Indicating German Development Actor Involvement in Reform 
Implementation, by Policy Cluster
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3.3.2
Usefulness of Policy Advice, Agenda-Setting 
influence, and Helpfulness During Reform 
Implementation, by Policy Cluster
Table 3-1 illustrates how Germany fares against an average 
DAC bilateral development partner on three different meas-
ures of performance: usefulness of policy advice, agenda-set-
ting influence, and helpfulness during reform implementation. 
The table presents the overall average scores of Germany 
on these three indicators as well as those of an average DAC 
bilateral development partner. We conduct a t-test on differ-
ences in the estimated averages between these two different 
development partners and examine whether Germany scored 
significantly below or above the overall DAC bilateral average.
The results in Table 3-1 suggest that Germany was par-
ticularly well regarded among those whose self-identified 
area of expertise is environmental policy. Within this policy 
cluster, Germany’s average scores of policy advice usefulness 
(3.62), agenda-setting influence (2.97), and helpfulness during 
reform implementation (3.37) were consistently higher than 
the corresponding scores for an average DAC development 
partner (3.25, 2.34, and 3.14, respectively). In particular, Germa-
ny registered scores that are higher than the DAC averages in 
terms of policy advice usefulness and reform implementation 
helpfulness. These results reinforce our earlier finding that 
Germany engaged more intensively with survey participants 
with environmental policy expertise than survey participants 
with any other types of policy expertise. Germany has 
historically played a leading role in addressing environmental 
issues as one of the key focal areas of its own development 
cooperation, which may explain why Germany outperformed 
other DAC development partners in this policy arena (BMZ 
2011; KfW 2011; GIZ 2014).
Germany did not consistently score above an average DAC 
development partner in any other policy area. In fact, 
survey participants from the governance policy cluster did 
not perceive Germany to be a particularly strong performer 
compared to the average DAC bilateral development 
partner. This finding should give German policymakers 
pause and provoke organizational introspection. Governance 
was one of the six key policy areas of German development co-
operation stated in the Coalition Agreement of October 2009 
(BMZ 2009, p. 5), and fighting corruption has been an integral 
part of Germany’s development strategy to promote good 
governance (OECD-DAC 2010).47 Germany has also invested 
in efforts to promote tax transparency, strengthen domestic 
revenue generation, and government accountability, which all 
constitute core elements of German development assistance 
(BMZ 2013).48 Yet, contrary to what one might expect given 
Germany’s rhetorical and programmatic emphasis on good 
governance, Table 3-1 shows that survey participants who 
specialized in governance issues, on average, perceived 
policy advice provided by Germany to contain useful infor-
mation less often, on average, than policy advice provided 
by an average DAC bilateral development partner. 
Germany’s average scores on the survey-based measures of 
agenda-setting influence and helpfulness of reform implemen-
tation were also lower than the overall DAC bilateral averages 
within this policy cluster. These findings suggest that Ger-
many has relatively little influence on governance reform 
priorities in its partner countries. Additionally, they suggest 
that Germany’s involvement in governance reform imple-
mentation is less helpful in comparison to the involvement 
of other DAC bilateral development partners. 
47 The 2005 DAC OECD Peer Review commends Germany for “being active in a number areas which tend to attract less funding from other donors, notably in the field of governance and environment” 
(p. 11).
48 The promotion of human rights is another area of focus that Germany has emphasized.  
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It is possible that these general patterns—Germany’s relatively 
high performance in the environmental sector and low perfor-
mance in the governance sector—may not hold across all three 
of the German development actors that we examine in this 
report. Thus, it is useful to take a closer look at how German 
embassies, GIZ, and KfW each perform on the three different 
indicators of development partner performance within each 
policy cluster. Figure 11 presents the average scores of policy 
advice usefulness, agenda-setting influence, and helpfulness 
during reform implementation for each of the German 
development actors, as well as the EU and DAC bilaterals (the 
latter two are used as a comparison group).49
All three German development actors earned relatively 
high scores on the usefulness of policy advice indicator 
among survey participants who specialized in environ-
mental issues (with scores of 3.31 for German embassies, 
3.92 for GIZ, and 3.23 for KfW). Furthermore, across all of 
the policy clusters in our study, German embassies, GIZ, and 
KfW registered their highest agenda-setting influence scores 
(2.69, 3.22, and 3.06, respectively) and reform implementation 
helpfulness scores (3.37, 3.62, and 3.48, respectively) in the 
environment policy cluster. These findings confirm our earlier 
observation that survey participants, on average, regard 
German development actors as adding the most value on 
environmental policy issues. 
By contrast, in the governance policy cluster, all three German 
development actors almost always scored lower than the EU 
and the average DAC bilateral development partner across 
the three indicators of performance (although the differences 
between German development partners and the DAC averages 
in these scores are, on average, not statistically significant). 
These patterns confirm our earlier observation that survey 
participants, on average, regard German development actors 
as being less valuable partners in the governance reform 
process. 50
Table 3-1: A Sectoral Analysis of German Development Actors’ Performance in Reform Efforts 
 
Usefulness of Advice Agenda-Setting influence Helpfulness during Reform 
Implementation
Germany DAC Germany DAC Germany DAC
Policy Cluster A B A-B C D C-D E F E-F
Macroeconomic 3.20 3.03 0.16 2.08 2.18 -0.10 3.16 3.17 -0.02
Social 3.06 3.32 -0.26 2.37 2.40 -0.03 2.81 3.31 -0.51**
Agriculture 3.17 3.18 -0.01 2.45 2.35 0.09 3.16 3.38 -0.23
Environment 3.62 3.25 0.37 ** 2.97 2.34 0.63*** 3.37 3.14 0.23
Governance 2.98 3.16 -0.13 2.24 2.45 -0.21* 3.06 3.19 -0.13
49 Numerical values used to generate Figure 11 are reported in Table B.1 in the Appendix.
50 We further investigate how German development partners each perform compared to the EU and other DAC donors within specific policy domains of environment and governance (see Table A.1 
for details on how policy domains are classified into six broader policy clusters). In Figure B.4 in the Appendix, we report the average scores of policy advice usefulness, agenda-setting influence, and 
helpfulness in reform implementation for German development actors as well as the EU and non-German DAC donors within the following specific policy domains: decentralization, anti-corruption 
and transparency, democracy, public administration, justice and security, public expenditure, as well as environmental protection and energy and mining. The results suggest that German development 
partners were perceived to be particularly well performing in the area of environmental protection, which is consistent with Germany’s strategic focus on the environmental sector. It is also worth 
noting that KfW’s performance was relatively weak compared to GIZ or German embassies in many governance-related policy domains, such as decentralization, anti-corruption, public administrati-
on, and justice and security. 
Notes: The average scores of policy advice usefulness, agenda-setting influence, and helpfulness for Germany are reported in Columns A, C, and E while the DAC bilateral average scores are presented 
in Columns B, D, and F. Difference-in-means tests are conducted to evaluate whether German development actors have scores that are statistically different from the average scores of DAC bilateral 
development partners (excluding German development actors). Asterisks indicate statistical significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
Source: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
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Figure 11: The Average Scores of Advice Usefulness, Agenda-Setting Influence, and Helpfulness during Reform 
Implementation, by Policy Cluster
Notes: Each dot in the figure corresponds to the estimated average scores of advice usefulness, agenda-setting influence, and helpfulness for German embassies, GIZ, and KfW, as well as EU and the 
DAC bilateral average, while horizontal bars around each point estimate correspond to 95% confidence intervals. The dashed grey lines represent the overall average scores of the DAC bilaterals across 
all policy clusters.
3.3.3
Usefulness of Policy Advice, Agenda-Setting 
Influence, and Helpfulness during Reform 
Implementation by Region
Policymakers and practitioners alike often cite the prolifer-
ation of projects and development partners as a source of 
aid ineffectiveness (OECD-DAC 2011). Development partners 
tend to spread their development finance activities too thinly 
across different countries and regions, including those for 
which they have little expertise or knowledge (Acharya et 
al. 2006). Germany has not been exempt from this critique 
(OECD-DAC 2001a).
Partner governments receiving development assistance 
interact with a multitude of development partners, which 
compete for limited partner country resources, financing 
opportunities, and policy influence (Anderson 2012). The 
increasingly competitive nature of the development landscape 
has encouraged Germany (and other major bilateral develop-
ment partners) to not only specialize in fewer sectors but also 
target their assistance to a more limited number of countries 
(Munro 2005; BMZ 2013; Faust & Ziaja 2012; OECD-DAC 2010). 
Source: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
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In 2008, the Government of Germany reduced its number of 
formal “partner countries” to 58 (down from 70) in an effort 
to improve aid efficiency and effectiveness (BMZ 2013).51 It 
has since further reduced this number to 50 partner countries 
(OECD-DAC 2015, p. 46), following the recommendation of the 
2010 DAC Peer Review (OECD-DAC 2010). 
The 2014 Reform Efforts Survey provides a unique opportunity 
to identify the countries and regions where Germany’s reform 
advice and assistance is valued the most – and the least. It 
reveals significant regional variation in the frequency at which 
survey participants perceived German development actors (or 
their policy advice) to be useful and the extent to which they 
proved influential and helpful in advising and implementing 
policy reforms. In Table 3-2, we report regional averages on 
our three measures of development partner performance for 
Germany and an average DAC bilateral development partner. 
We also conduct a t-test on differences in the estimated av-
erage scores between Germany and an average DAC bilateral 
development partner and evaluate the geographical regions 
in which Germany was regarded as providing valuable reform 
advice and assistance. 
Notes: The average scores of policy advice usefulness, agenda-setting influence, and helpfulness for Germany are reported in Columns A, C, and E while the DAC bilateral average scores are presented 
in Columns B, D, and F. Difference-in-means tests are conducted to evaluate whether German development actors have scores that are statistically different from the average scores of DAC bilateral 
development partners (excluding German development actors). Asterisks indicate statistical significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
We find that Germany consistently registered performance 
scores that exceed DAC bilateral averages in two regions: 
Europe and Central Asia and the Middle East and North 
Africa. Survey participants from these regions, on average, 
regard Germany as providing more useful policy advice and to 
be more influential and helpful in initiating and implementing 
reforms, as compared to the other DAC bilateral development 
partners. 
This pattern may reflect the fact that geographical proximity 
influences Germany’s level of engagement with a given 
country (Faust & Ziaja 2012; Grabbe 2002). It is also possible 
that Germany’s concerted efforts – for example, through 
the TRANSFORM Program – to integrate Eastern European 
countries into the EU politically and economically, and the 
desire of these countries to join the EU, may have played a role 
in affecting the degree to which survey participants from the 
Table 3-2: A Regional Analysis of German Development Actors’ Performance in Reform Efforts
Usefulness of Advice Agenda-Setting influence Helpfulness during Reform 
Implementation
Germany DAC Germany DAC Germany DAC
Region A B A-B C D C-D E F E-F
East Asia and Pacific 2.89 3.13 -0.23 2.04 2.46 -0.42 3.00 3.27 -0.28
Europe & Central Asia 3.67 3.59 0.08 2.79 2.39 0.40*** 3.23 3.22 0.01
Latin America 2.49 2.75 -0.26* 1.81 2.13 -0.32* 3.14 3.19 -0.05
Middle East & North 
Africa
3.23 2.84 0.39* 2.19 2.02 0.16 3.51 3.10 0.41*
South Asia 2.98 -0.16 1.72 2.02 -0.30 2.48 2.80 2.80 -0.31
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.27 3.26 0.01 2.17 2.41 -0.23* 2.99 3.15 -0.15
51 Germany’s formally designated partner countries receive more intense development co-operation and full bilateral country programmes in up to three priority sectors, while non-partner countries 
continue to receive German development assistance “as part of regional or sector programmes in one priority area (including NGO support, scholarships, refugee aid), or as debt relief” (OECD-DAC 
2010, p. 31; OECD-DAC 2015, p. 50).
Source: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
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52 For instance, Latin America as a region received the smallest proportions of GTZ and BMZ budget funds in 2004 (13% and 11%) (OECD-DAC 2006). A relatively low percentage of German regional 
budgets going to Latin America is partly explained by the fact that “in a middle-income region like Latin America, which has also made some development progress in the past ten years, the relative 
importance of international ODA has fallen” (BMZ 2008b, p. 15). 
53 In 2011-12, sub-Saharan Africa has accounted for 23% of Germany’s bilateral ODA, by far the largest share of German development assistance (OECD-DAC 2014).
54 As Knack and Rahman (2007) argue, Africa is particularly vulnerable to the negative impact of aid fragmentation (or the presence of numerous donors providing relatively small amounts of develop-
ment assistance) on bureaucratic quality.
region value the reform advice provided by German develop-
ment actors (Tucker et al. 2002). 
By contrast, Germany received comparatively lower scores 
in Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of policy 
advice usefulness and agenda-setting influence. Despite 
Germany’s renewed commitment to the region as a trusted 
partner for tackling global challenges (The Government of 
Germany 2010), Latin America accounts for a rather small 
portion of the overall German development budget, which 
may be one reason why Germany performs relatively less well 
in this region.52 
Surprisingly, survey participants from sub-Saharan Africa 
gave Germany relatively low marks on their agenda-setting 
influence and helpfulness during reform implementation, 
in comparison to the average DAC bilateral development 
partner. These findings are somewhat counter-intuitive given 
that Africa has constituted a key regional focus of German 
development cooperation and the region accounts for the 
largest share of German aid budget (BMZ 2013, p. 21).53 One 
potential explanation for this finding may be that since 
there are a multitude of development partners operating in 
Africa, governments in the region can “shop around for offers 
of assistance” from other development partners without 
addressing external pressures for reform (Boyce 2002, p. 23; 
Hernandez 2016).54
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I
n this section, we shift from purely descriptive analysis to 
multivariate, econometric analysis to gain further insight 
into the factors that shape the way that development poli-
cymakers and practitioners regard Germany’s performance 
as a development partner in low and middle-income countries. 
Our descriptive analysis has revealed that there is substantial 
regional and sectoral variation in the degree to which survey 
participants believed that Germany positively contributed 
to informing, initiating, and implementing reform efforts in 
their countries. We now seek to adjudicate between different 
plausible hypotheses about the determinants of Germany’s 
perceived performance in advising, influencing, and aiding the 
reform process. 
We hypothesize that the interplay between external and 
domestic factors shapes and conditions in-country stake-
holder perceptions of Germany as a development partner. 
In particular, we argue—and find strong evidence—that (1) the 
relative position and significance of Germany in a counterpart 
country’s “aid market” affects the extent to which it can 
influence reform priorities and efforts; (2) Germany’s policy 
influence is conditioned by the level of democracy or political 
openness of its counterpart countries; (3) Germany’s reform 
influence is compromised when there are more competing 
donor agencies vying for influence; and, lastly, (4) the presence 
of broad domestic support is critical for German development 
partners to effectively exert their influence on the policy 
reform process. 
4.1
Modelling Determinants of Germany’s 
Performance as a Development Partner
Variation in Germany’s perceived performance as a devel-
opment partner may be explained by the focusing of its 
development efforts in certain regions, countries, and sectors. 
However, a multitude of other factors may shape in-country 
decision-maker and local stakeholder perceptions of German 
development actors. These may include characteristics that 
are specific to partner countries, such as the size of the 
economy or population; political or economic openness; and 
the relative importance of German development finance vis-à-
vis other sources of revenue. In addition, one must account for 
characteristics that are specific to the survey participants who 
evaluated German development actors. 
4.1.1
Dependent Variable(s)
Our dependent variable of interest is the extent to which 
German development actors affected the reform processes of 
low- and middle-income countries (between 2004 and 2013). 
Our measures of development partner performance are based 
upon the perceptions of survey participants with firsthand 
experience working with individual German development 
actors.
Consistent with the descriptive section of this report, we 
use the three different indicators taken from the 2014 Reform 
Efforts Survey as proxies to measure the outcome of our 
interest: 1) a 1-5 point measure of policy advice usefulness; 
2) a 0-5 point measure of agenda-setting influence; and 3) 
a 0-5 point measure of helpfulness during reform imple-
mentation. It is important to emphasize that our measure of 
Germany’s contributions to the reform processes of its partner 
countries is based on the perceptions of survey participants, 
which may or may not directly correlate with the actual degree 
of reform success achieved in these countries. However, the 
goal of our econometric analysis is more narrowly defined: 
to explain variation in the degree to which policymakers and 
practitioners in the field reported that German development 
actors provided useful information and successfully influenced 
and assisted the reform efforts of their partner countries.
4.1.2
Hypotheses and Independent Variables
To our knowledge, there has been no empirical study to date 
that surveys a large number of policymakers and practitioners 
in low- and middle-income countries and evaluates their 
firsthand observations of and experiences with specific 
development partners through rigorous quantitative analysis. 
Given the lack of existing literature on factors that may 
influence the perceptions of development policymakers and 
practitioners, we turn to a broader literature on aid allocation 
and aid effectiveness to inform our variable selection.
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The first hypothesis that we test is the notion that develop-
ment policymakers and practitioners from partner countries 
receiving a large share of aid from German development 
actors will report that Germany is a particularly valuable 
source of reform advice and assistance. 
An emerging consensus in the aid literature is that develop-
ment partners often use development assistance as leverage 
to achieve policy influence with their partner country govern-
ments (Dietrich 2013, Kono & Montinola 2009, Bapat 2011, Bue-
no de Mesquita & Smith 2009). If Germany has indeed used its 
development aid in the form of financial or technical assis-
tance as a means to promote its preferred policy objectives, 
we would expect that the relative financial significance of 
German aid (in a partner country’s overall aid portfolio) should 
be positively correlated with the reported level of Germany’s 
policy reform influence. We measure the relative importance 
of German aid in a given partner country by using the average 
share of German Country Programmable Aid (CPA) out of the 
total amount of CPA that the country received between 2004 
and 2013 (hereafter, we refer to this variable as CPA1). Data on 
CPA1 are drawn from the OECD International Development 
Statistics database.
The existing literature also suggests that the impact of devel-
opment aid on partner country reform efforts is conditional 
on the nature of the political regime in those countries. Faust 
(2010) argues that the degree to which a given partner country 
can undertake far-reaching reforms is partly determined by 
the nature of the political process that a government must 
go through to initiate or implement reforms. In fact, some 
scholars argue that reforms are easier in autocratic settings, 
where a small cadre of political elites can push for immediate 
changes without regard to potential repercussions from 
various segments of society, which could otherwise obstruct 
the reform process under more democratic conditions 
(Woo-Cumings 1999; Haggard 1990; Devarajan et al. 2001). 
Wintrobe (1998, p. 338) puts it this way: autocratic regimes 
“have a greater capacity for action, good or bad.”  
 
Based upon this logic, the second hypothesis we test is 
that the positive effect of Germany’s aid on its perceived 
contribution to reform processes will be mediated by the 
level of democracy in the partner country (DEMOCRACY). 
DEMOCRACY is measured using the POLITY2 variable in 
Polity IV, which ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 
(consolidated democracy) (Marshall & Jaggers 2003). Following 
Svensson’s (1999) study on the relationships between aid and 
growth, we introduce an interaction term between CPA1 and 
DEMOCRACY to estimate differential reform effects of CPA1 at 
different levels of democracy.
Recognizing that development partners compete against each 
other for policy influence to advance their respective policy 
preferences, priorities, and agendas  (Acharya et al. 2006; 
Schadlow 2013), the level of fragmentation in a country’s “aid 
market” may also predict Germany’s reported level of influ-
ence on partner country reform processes.55 As a general rule, 
the more competition that exists among aid suppliers (de-
velopment partners), the more bargaining power that buyers 
(aid-receiving countries) should possess (Klein & Harford 2005; 
Bourguignon & Platteau 2015). Consequently, if a multitude 
of development partners are seeking to achieve influence in 
a limited policy space within a given country, the ability of 
any individual development partner to instigate far-reaching 
reforms may be compromised (Hernandez 2016).56 Conversely, 
when there is limited competition in the aid market, it stands 
to reason that any individual development partner should 
exert greater policy influence (Steinwand 2015).
We therefore test a third hypothesis: that higher levels of aid 
fragmentation will negatively influence Germany’s perceived 
contribution to reform processes in partner countries. We use 
a measure of aid fragmentation from the OECD-DAC (FRAG), 
which captures the number of “insignificant” development 
partners as a proportion of the total number of development 
partners present in a given country.57 
Finally, we consider the role of domestic political support in 
shaping the trajectory of the reform process. In particular, 
we posit that the presence of broad domestic support for 
reforms positively will amplify Germany’s perceived influence 
55 The presence of “too many donors” increases transaction costs associated with the management of relations between development partners and host countries (OECD 2011). 
56 See Annen and Moers (2012) for their formal theory of how it is of strategic interest for donors to spread their aid widely and thinly to carve out policy influence, which results in a high level of aid 
fragmentation.
57 See OECD-DAC (2009) for details on the definition of aid fragmentation.
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in shaping partner country reform processes. As a large body 
of literature has demonstrated (e.g., Chassy 2014; Santiso 
2001; Kahler 1992), local ownership and domestic support are 
usually critical for the successful implementation of reforms. 
In particular, the presence of domestic allies—or those whom 
Chwieroth (2013, p. 267) refers to as “sympathetic domestic 
interlocutors”—who ally with international development or-
ganizations in undertaking reforms is a key strategy employed 
by donors to effectuate change. Thus, we hypothesize that the 
level of domestic political support for reform will condition 
the degree to which Germany can meaningfully influence the 
reform processes of partner countries. The 2014 Reform Efforts 
Survey asked participants to identify key domestic actors (e.g., 
the head of state, the legislature, the judiciary, and civil society 
groups) that they believed had devoted substantial time, 
effort, or resources to promote reforms pursued by the partner 
government. The level of domestic support (DOMESTIC 
SUPPORT) is measured based on the sheer number of domes-
tic actors (e.g., the executive, legislature, judiciary, military) 
that participants identified as important supporters of partner 
countries’ reform processes in the survey.
We include a battery of control variables to guard against bias 
that may arise from failing to account for potential confound-
ing effects. Our controls consist of a set of variables that the 
aid literature commonly identifies as significant determinants 
of aid allocation.58 These variables include: GDP per capita 
(USD2000 constant, in thousands) (GDP PER CAPITA), the 
annual growth rate of GDP (GDP GROWTH), as well as the log 
of population (POP). All these variables are taken from World 
Development Indicators.
Additionally, we include the following variables to measure 
the strategic and commercial importance of a given partner 
country to Germany: the share of German CPA to a particular 
partner country as a percentage of the total annual German 
CPA budgets (CPA2) and German exports to a given partner 
country as a share of total German exports across all trading 
countries (GERMAN EXP). A greater share of German CPA 
or exports to a given partner country likely reflects that a 
country has greater political or economic significance to 
Germany, which may in turn affect the general perceptions of 
in-country decision-makers and stakeholders towards German 
development partners. We compute the share of German CPA 
based on the OECD-DAC CPA data while data on German 
exports derive from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
(Destatis). Minimum distance from Germany (measured in 
kilometres) is also included as an additional control to account 
for the possibility that decision-makers and stakeholders in 
countries that are geographically proximate may evaluate 
Germany’s policy influence and performance more (or less) 
favorably (Faust & Ziaja 2012; Grabbe 2002; Tucker et al. 2002). 
Furthermore, we include dummy variables that capture 
whether a given country was formally identified as Germany’s 
partner country in 1998 (PARTNER98) and in 2008 or 2011 
(PARTNER08-11). They take on a value of 1 if a country was 
identified as a formal partner country for Germany in the 
given year; zero otherwise.59 In recent years, Germany has 
significantly reduced the number of its partner countries 
to have an increased regional and country focus. The list of 
Germany’s partner countries was revised in 1998, 2008, and 
2011 (BMZ 2013). It is plausible that in-country stakeholders 
from Germany’s partner countries may exhibit more favoura-
ble views on the perceived level of influence and performance 
Germany exerts in affecting the reform process.
We also include a number of survey participant-specific 
characteristics—such as sex (SEX), years of in-country experi-
ence (EXP), the number of development partners the survey 
participant interacted with (INTERACTION), and interaction 
with multilateral development partners (MULTI)—as additional 
controls to account for variation in the demographic and 
professional backgrounds of survey participants themselves. 
Finally, since the baseline perceptions of participants on the 
performance of German development partners in affecting 
partner country reform processes may be affected by which 
German development partners they interacted with or 
believed to be involved in reform implementation efforts,60 
we include dummy variables (GIZ and KfW) that are coded 1 
58 Since the key independent variable of our interest is CPA1, our models explicitly control for variables that affect the flow of CPA1 as well as our dependent variable of our interest, the perceived level 
of Germany’s contribution to the reform process.
59 See footnote 50 for a brief description of Germany’s development partnership. 
60 For instance, our descriptive analysis suggests that GIZ scored consistently higher than the other two German development actors analysed in this study. Since we are modelling participants’ per-
ceptions towards these three different German development actors all in one model, we may need to account for the baseline differences in the perceived level of their performance in affecting reform 
efforts. The inclusion of the dummies (GIZ and KfW) does just that.
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if participants interacted with GIZ or KfW (or indicated their 
involvement in reform implementation efforts) and zero oth-
erwise (making those who interacted with German embassies 
the baseline group). Descriptive statistics for these variables 
are reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C.61
4.1.3
Methodology for Multivariate Analysis
The nature and structure of the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey 
guided our approach to model selection. As shown in Figure 
1, survey participants first selected development partners 
that they evaluated in the survey. That is, we only observe the 
perceptions of participants who indicated that they had direct, 
in-country interactions with German development actors 
(or that these actors were directly involved in implementing 
reform efforts in their respective countries). This means that 
we have censored outcomes where we only observe respons-
es about the perceived level of Germany’s policy advice 
usefulness, agenda-setting influence, or helpfulness during 
reform implementation from those survey participants who 
either worked directly with German development partners 
(for the first two outcomes) or for those survey participants 
who indicated that specific German development partner 
were involved in reform implementation efforts (for the last 
outcome).62
Heckman’s (1979) selection model is suited for a data 
structure with censored outcomes.63 We therefore use this 
model to explain related outcomes in two stages: (1) whether 
participants interacted with German development actors or 
indicated their involvement in reform implementation in the 
first place; and (2) their evaluations of German development 
partners on policy advice usefulness, agenda-setting influence, 
and helpfulness during reform implementation. 
In the first stage of analysis, we estimate a Probit model (using 
the full sample) to explain the probability of participants’ 
participation in the outcome stage. In the second stage of 
analysis, we employ an Ordered Probit model for policy advice 
usefulness (as it is an ordinal variable) and a standard linear 
OLS model for agenda-setting influence and helpfulness 
in implementing policy reforms.64 At the outcome stage, it 
is important to note that we are using only the subsample 
of participants who interacted with German development 
actors (for the outcome indicators that measure policy advice 
usefulness and agenda-setting influence) and the subsample 
of participants who indicated German development partner 
involvement in reform implementation efforts (for the 
outcome indicators that measure helpfulness during reform 
implementation). 
One of the key challenges in employing the Heckman model 
is to identify a set of variables that only affect participants’ 
propensity to interact with German development actors or 
indicate their involvement in reform implementation (the 
selection stage) and do not affect our outcomes of interest 
(the outcome stage) (Sartori 2003). We choose to exclude 
the following variables from the outcome stage of analysis 
and include them only in the selection stage: the number of 
development partners with which a participant interacted with 
(INTERACTION), years of in-country experience (EXP), and sex 
(SEX). 
While these variables may impact the propensity of survey 
participants to interact with German development actors (and 
thus indicate their involvement in reform implementation), we 
believe that they should not directly impact their perceptions. 
For instance, while INTERACTION captures the general 
propensity of participants to interact with more development 
partners, there are no strong theoretical reasons to believe 
that this variable will have an independent impact on how par-
ticipants evaluate the performance of German development 
actors. Indeed, none of these variables (INTERACTION, EXP, 
and SEX) are significant predictors of the outcome variables 
61 All country-level variables (e.g., GDP per capita or GDP growth) are averaged over the period between 2004 and 2013. 
62 It is important to note that the propensity of participants to interact with German development partners and the propensity of participants to indicate their involvement in reform implementation 
are highly correlated. We believe that this is because participants, through interacting directly with German development partners, gained deeper understandings of their development activities and 
thus of their direct engagement in the process of reform implementation (if there was any).
63 The Heckman model accounts for self-selection bias—or the presence of potential confounders that may have affected the propensity of participants indicating interactions with German develop-
ment partners or their involvement in reform implementation.
64 One may recall that a 1-5 scale used to measure the frequency of useful policy advice is not linear. That is, each value of this indicator has a substantive meaning associated with it. See Section 3.1.1. 
for the description of this dependent variable.
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(while INTERACTION turns out to be strongly positively 
correlated with the selection variables). 
As we mentioned earlier in this study, some participants 
interacted with two or more German development actors (or 
indicated that two or more German development actors were 
involved in reform implementation efforts). These participants 
then evaluated each development partner separately in the 
“outcome” stage of the survey. Survey participants rated 
individual German development actors on a 0-5 scale for 
policy advice usefulness and on a 1-5 scale for agenda-setting 
influence and helpfulness in reform implementation. For this 
reason, we need to convert the survey data into a dyadic 
dataset where a participant who interacted with two or more 
German development partners (or indicated their involvement 
in reform implementation efforts) counts as two or more 
observations in the dataset.65 In doing so, we can explicitly 
model the probability of each participant’s participation in the 
“outcome” stage and their performance evaluations of each 
German development actor.
4.2
Results
Table 4-1 demonstrates that the effect of the share of German 
CPA (CPA1) is always positive across the three different speci-
fications of donor performance, but it is only significant at the 
conventional level (p<0.05) for the perceived level of Germa-
ny’s agenda-setting influence. These results are consistent 
with our earlier findings, in which we observed that a donor’s 
relative financial weight in the “aid market” seems to shape 
the extent to which it can influence the reform priorities of 
partner country counterparts. That is, the larger the relative 
size of German financial support to a given partner country, 
the greater the influence that German development actors 
will have on the partner country’s reform priorities.
The degree to which development partners can use aid as 
an instrument to advance reforms is also constrained by the 
domestic political processes of partner countries. In particular, 
some have argued that decision-making autonomy vested in 
autocratic regimes makes it easier for such governments to 
pursue radical development reforms (Kelsall & Booth 2013; 
Woo-Cumings 1999; Haggard 1990). There are fewer veto 
points in the decision-making processes of autocratic regimes, 
which could otherwise delay actions to undertake or imple-
ment reforms under more democratic conditions (World Bank 
2002). Consistent with this line of argumentation, our results 
indicate that the relative importance of German aid has a 
positive impact on Germany’s reported level of agenda-set-
ting influence, but this effect only holds in countries where 
political openness is limited. 
One must therefore be cautious in interpreting the estimated 
coefficients on CPA1 presented in Table 4-1 due to the presence 
of the interaction term between CPA1 and DEMOCRACY. The 
effect of the interaction is negative and significant, indicating 
that the positive effect of CPA1 on the perceived level of 
Germany’s agenda-setting influence diminishes as the level of 
DEMOCRACY increases. Figure 12 shows how the marginal ef-
fect of CPA1 on Germany’s agenda-setting influence changes at 
different levels of DEMOCRACY. The black solid line represents 
the marginal effect of CPA1 while the dashed lines around it 
denote a 95% confidence band. The black solid line has a clear 
downward slope, which shows that the positive effect of CPA1 
becomes closer to zero as the values of DEMOCRACY increase. 
Although the effect of CPA1 is positive and significant at lower 
values of DEMOCRACY, it becomes statistically indistinguisha-
ble from zero at higher values of DEMOCRACY.66
We also find evidence for a hypothesized negative relation-
ship between donor fragmentation and the reported level 
of German policy influence on the reform priorities of its 
partner countries. The effect of FRAG is negative and signif-
icant at the .05 level for agenda-setting influence, although 
we do not find similar effects for the other two performance 
measures. These results suggest that the degree to which 
Germany can exert influence on the reform priorities of its 
partner countries is affected by the number of donors vying 
for influence in those very same countries. When there are a 
65 We have also estimated the same set of models for GIZ, KfW, and German embassies separately and found that our main conclusions remain unchanged after disaggregating the sample. The results 
are available upon request.
66 More substantively, while the perceived level of agenda-setting influence is expected to increase by 0.38 for a 1% increase in CPA1 under societies where the Polity rating of democracy is set at zero, 
this positive effect diminishes to 0.1 as the Polity rating increases to the highest level of democracy with a score of 10.
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multitude of donor agencies seeking to influence the reform 
process, donors often do not “speak with one voice” and fail 
to coordinate their activities, thereby creating opportunities 
for the host government to “play donors off one another” and 
to evade external pressures for reform (Van de Walle 2005; 
Gibson et al. 2005; Bourguignon & Platteau 2015).
The regression results presented in Table 4-1 also reveal that 
domestic reform support has a significant positive effect on 
the perceived level of Germany’s agenda-setting influence. 
This finding is consistent with the notion that broad support 
from a wide range of domestic stakeholders, including not 
only host government officials but also civil society groups, is 
critical to ensure host government commitment to the reform 
objectives pursued by external development partners (Chassy 
2014).67
We do not find any individual-level characteristics that 
strongly affect how participants evaluate German de-
velopment partners.68 Nor do we find enough evidence to 
suggest that the political or economic importance of a partner 
country to Germany, as captured by GERMAN EXP and CPA2, 
affects the reported level of German development partner 
performance.
67 It is plausible that German development actors themselves have made efforts to mobilize domestic support in their partner countries and thus, the presence of broad-based domestic support may 
not necessarily be a cause but an outcome of their pronounced influence. The direction of causality should therefore be interpreted with caution.
68 Though not reported in Table 4-1, we also tested a battery of other participant-specific characteristics that may affect the perceptions of policymakers and practitioners towards German develop-
ment actors. These include, but are not limited to, the level of education, the nature of daily work (e.g., political, technical, or administrative), previous experience of working for German development 
actors, and the perceived level of reform success in a given country. None of these factors seem to affect the perceived level of German performance in affecting the reform process.
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Table 4-1: Regression Results from Heckman Models: Determinants of Perceptions towards German Development Actors
Policy Adive Usefulness Agenda-Setting Influence Helpfulness in Reform 
Implementation
Models Heckman (Ordered Probit) Heckman Heckman 
Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome
CPA1 (ln)
0.108
(0.075)
0.067
(0.149)
0.152
(0.070)**
0.384
(0.193)**
0.230
(0.084)***
-0.005
(0.215)
DEMOCRACY
-0.015
(0.010)
-0.024
(0.017)
-0.011
(0.010)
0.026
(0.019)
-0.005
(0.013)
-0.031
(0.030)
CPA1 (ln) × DEMOCRACY
0.006
(0.007)
0.011
(0.012)
0.007
(0.007)
-0.030
(0.013)**
-0.001
(0.008)
0.003
(0.021)
FRAG
-0.005
(0.004)
0.009
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.018
(0.008)**
-0.012
(0.004)***
0.002
(0.008)
CPA2 (ln)
0.064
(0.065)
0.009
(0.129)
0.051
(0.060)
-0.068
(0.156)
0.002
(0.072)
0.222
(0.167)
GDP PER CAPITA
0.089
(0.034)***
-0.045
(0.054)
0.057
(0.031)*
-0.042
(0.065)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
GDP GROWTH
-0.027
(0.016)*
-0.044
(0.029)
-0.029
(0.014)**
-0.021
(0.032)
-0.031
(0.016)*
-0.023
(0.031)
POP (ln)
-0.013
(0.057)
-0.091
(0.110)
-0.050
(0.051)
-0.023
(0.130)
-0.086
(0.058)
-0.216
(0.133)
PARTNER98
0.077
(0.096)
-0.138
(0.175)
0.021
(0.085)
-0.048
(0.186)
0.050
(0.096)
-0.043
(0.219)
PARTNER08-11
0.152
(0.081)*
-0.058
(0.143)
0.202
(0.075)***
-0.204
(0.168)
0.232
(0.089)***
-0.445
(0.171)***
GERMAN EXP (ln)
-0.038
(0.041)
-0.001
(0.075)
-0.004
(0.037)
-0.015
(0.082)
0.061
(0.043)
0.014
(0.083)
DISTANCE (ln)
-0.004
(0.106)
0.166
(0.189)
0.020
(0.094)
0.035
(0.193)
0.119
(0.102)
0.183
(0.192)
MULTI
-0.422
(0.166)**
0.338
(0.250)
-0.428
(0.146)***
-0.445
(0.303)
-0.394
(0.158)**
-0.247
(0.271)
DOMESTIC SUPPORT
-0.013
(0.011)
0.032
(0.020)
0.003
(0.010)
0.086
(0.023)***
0.023
(0.012)**
0.051
(0.024)**
SEX
-0.153
(0.068)**
-0.115
(0.062)*
-0.155
(0.077)**
INTERACTION (ln)
1.060
(0.060)***
0.973
(0.052)***
0.647
(0.059)***
EXP
0.013
(0.023)
-0.011
(0.021)
0.003
(0.025)
GIZ
0.327
(0.129)**
0.395
(0.134)***
0.020
(0.135)
KfW
0.039
(0.107)
0.190
(0.121)
0.408
(0.119)***
Europe and Central Asia
0.116
(0.194)
0.727
(0.361)**
0.190
(0.170)
0.089
(0.351)
0.221
(0.199)
-0.026
(0.336)
Latin America and the Caribbean
-0.165
(0.145)
-0.095
(0.269)
-0.264
(0.131)**
-0.462
(0.292)
-0.518
(0.165)***
0.072
(0.322)
Middle East and North Africa
0.228
(0.201)
0.286
(0.378)
0.265
(0.180)
-0.413
(0.373)
0.103
(0.212)
-0.149
(0.371)
South Asia
-0.058
(0.178)
0.148
(0.301)
0.051
(0.155)
-0.441
(0.307)
-0.072
(0.184)
-0.633
(0.384)*
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Sub-Saharan Africa
0.056
(0.128)
0.271
(0.241)
0.110
(0.115)
-0.535
(0.219)**
-0.003
(0.131)
-0.362
(0.229)
Macroeconomic
-0.202
(0.088)**
0.226
(0.163)
-0.092
(0.083)
-0.084
(0.194)
-0.249
(0.097)**
0.036
(0.192)
Social
-0.314
(0.095)***
0.298
(0.183)
-0.266
(0.088)***
0.127
(0.198)
-0.435
(0.105)***
0.029
(0.218)
Agriculture
-0.135
(0.115)
-0.052
(0.199)
-0.079
(0.115)
0.110
(0.228)
-0.168
(0.134)
0.014
(0.240)
Environment
0.242
(0.116)**
0.421
(0.203)**
0.222
(0.110)**
0.704
(0.268)***
0.406
(0.122)***
0.418
(0.216)*
Governance
-0.285
(0.092)***
0.010
(0.176)
-0.184
(0.083)**
0.101
(0.204)
-0.337
(0.094)***
-0.013
(0.199)
CSO/NGO
0.086
(0.066)
-0.036
(0.151)
0.100
(0.078)
-0.111
(0.146)
Private Sector
0.119
(0.129)
-0.461
(0.213)**
-0.058
(0.174)
-0.659
(0.445)
Threshold
μ1 0.047 (2.376)
μ2 0.718 (2.378)
μ3 1.321 (2.380)
μ4 1.990 (2.388)
N 5851 796 6109 1054 5654 578
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by participant. Non-response weights are applied to all these regressions. Asterisks indicate statistical significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; 
*p<0.10.
Source: Own calculatoins based on 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
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Notes: The solid black line represents the marginal effect of CPA1 on Germany’s agenda-setting influence at different levels of DEMOCRACY. The dashed lines around the black line shows the 95 
confidence intervals. The estimates are from Model 2 in Table 4-1.
Figure 12: The Marginal Effect of CPA1 on Germany’s Agenda-Setting Influence
The results from our regression models suggest that the 
relative size of German CPA and the level of democracy (and 
the interaction between them) are key predictors of the extent 
to which Germany is reportedly influential in affecting host 
governments’ decisions to pursue reforms. We subjected these 
findings to a variety of robustness checks. 
First, we included a battery of other participant-level covari-
ates to account for heterogeneity across survey participants. 
To account for pro-reform and anti-reform biases among 
survey participants and the fact that donors may have received 
more or less favourable evaluations based upon the nature 
of the reforms that they tried to influence (e.g., reforms that 
were regarded as too ambitious or too shallow), we draw 
upon a question in the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey that asked 
participants to assess the degree to which the government 
attempted reform on a 1-3 scale (with a 1 indicating “Too much”, 
2 “Too little”, and 3 “About the right amount”) and whether 
reforms pursued between 2003 and 2014 focused on what they 
believed was the most critical issue. We used these survey 
data to generate a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a given 
participant indicated the government attempted about the 
right amount of reform, and 0 otherwise (REFORM ATTEMPT). 
We also included a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a given 
participant indicated the government focused on the most 
critical issue, and 0 otherwise (REFORM FOCUS). The inclusion 
of these additional controls does not affect our main results 
(See Column 1 in Table D.1, Appendix D).
It is also possible that a survey participant’s level of seniority 
might influence his or her views towards development 
partners.  The 2014 Reform Efforts Survey asked participants 
Source: Own calculation based
on 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
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to identify what percentages of time they spent on political 
matters, technical issues, or administrative tasks. Drawing 
upon these data, we generated and included in our models two 
separate dummy variables that are coded 1 if a given partici-
pant allocated the largest amount of time to political issues 
(POLITICAL) or technical issues (TECHNICAL); zero otherwise. 
Additionally, we generated dummy variables for each language 
in which the survey was taken69 and included them as addi-
tional controls (to account for the possibility that cultural and/
or language backgrounds may systematically affect the way 
participants evaluated German development actors). Again, 
the main results remain intact after including these additional 
control variables except that FRAG is no longer significant at 
the conventional level (See Column 2 in Table D.1, Appendix 
D). 
We also use the Freedom House (FH) Political Rights score as 
an alternative measure of democracy to test if the main results 
are robust to a different measure of democracy. The FH score 
ranges from 0 (the lowest level of freedom) to 7 (the highest 
level of freedom). To make a comparison with the Polity2 score 
easier, we reverse the scale of the FH score such that higher 
values indicate greater freedom. Once again, the main results 
still hold (See Column 3 in Table D.1, Appendix D). Lastly, we 
test if the presence of outliers may skew our findings. After 
estimating the outcome stage model using OLS regression, we 
compute studentized residuals and identify outliers or obser-
vations whose computed studentized residuals lie beyond 2 or 
below -2. Excluding these outliers does not significantly affect 
our main findings (See Column 4 in Table D.1, Appendix D).
69 Survey participants were able to select in which language (English, Spanish, French, Portuguese, or Russian) the survey questions were asked.
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N
otwithstanding the significant development gains 
that have been achieved since the MDGs were 
adopted at the Millennium Summit in September 
2000, many countries have failed to reach their 
performance targets by the end of 2015 (World Bank 2015). 
Therefore, as a new set of Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) are put in place within the framework of the Agenda 
2030 to guide the next fifteen-year period, it behooves 
development partners to engage in an evidence-based process 
of critical introspection and review key lessons from the MDG 
era with an eye toward adjusting their policies, programs, and 
practices during the 2015-2030 SDG implementation period. 
In this report, we draw on data from the 2014 Reform Efforts 
Survey to gain insight into how development policymakers 
and practitioners in the low- and middle-income countries 
perceive the performance of external development partners. 
We therefore examine German development actors in a 
comparative context and highlight the factors that enable 
and constrain their policy influence in the developing world. 
This source of survey evidence provides, for the first time, 
micro-level evidence on the comparative strengths of German 
development partners and where they exert greater and lesser 
influence on the reform efforts of counterpart governments. 
The data are unique in that they are drawn from in-country 
counterparts who reported on their firsthand experiences with 
and observations of German development partner perfor-
mance between 2004 and 2013. 
Our findings suggest that stakeholders in partner countries 
do not strongly differentiate between the different roles 
and responsibilities of the different German development 
actors. Given the period covered by the 2014 Reform Efforts 
Survey, this finding does not necessarily come as a surprise. 
While KfW and GIZ were always deeply engaged with partner 
governments in designing (and implementing) specific 
development programs, German embassies were in the past 
largely dependent on the implementation agencies, particu-
larly GTZ, during substantive sector discussions (OECD-DAC 
2001b, p. 59). In fact, there are reasons to believe that, for 
most of our period of study, German embassy contributions 
to in-country policy discussions were more limited than those 
of the implementation agencies (GIZ and KfW) due to “the 
extremely small number of qualified staff authorized by the 
[German] Embassies to deal with development policy” (Ibid.). 
As explained in Box 1 in Section 1.2, it was only after 2011 that 
the number of staff seconded from BMZ to the embassies was 
increased substantially and that the embassies were formally 
tasked with leading the sector policy dialogue.
These findings also beg the question of whether the recent 
reorganization of Germany’s aid system has enhanced or 
otherwise affected its development policy influence and 
performance. It must be left to future research to evaluate the 
impact of these organizational reforms. However, future waves 
of AidData’s survey will enable such analysis and the data 
used in this study provide a valuable baseline for a follow-up 
evaluation. 
Additionally, our findings suggest that Germany’s reform 
advice and assistance is perceived to be particularly useful 
and influential in the environmental policy arena. There are a 
number of reasons why Germany may have exerted outsized 
influence in this sector between 2004 and 2013. One obvious 
explanation is that Germany possesses technical expertise 
in this area and has devoted significant time, money, and 
attention to environmental protection and remediation issues 
in low-income and middle-income countries (OECD-DAC 2005, 
p. 2010).70 Another potential factor contributing to Germany’s 
strong performance is the fact that the environment sector 
has historically attracted relatively little financial support from 
other donors, which may increase the bargaining power of 
German development actors vis-à-vis host governments (Hicks 
et al. 2008).
This study also reveals that Germany’s policy influence is 
particularly pronounced in Europe and Central Asia and Middle 
East and North Africa. These findings are not too surprising 
given the physical proximity and relatively strong ties of these 
two regions to Germany. However, it should be noted that 
Germany’s policy influence in Central and Eastern Europe 
may have been amplified by the aspirations of many countries 
in the region to join the EU (or forge stronger ties with it). 
Indeed, in many of these countries, Germany and the EU have 
70 For example, Germany has spearheaded efforts to integrate environmental assessments into its development projects. Today, all new German projects and programs need to pass a “Climate Check,” 
which assesses the estimated environmental risks of a proposed project and its emission savings (OECD 2010, p. 92). 
48 5.  |  Conclusions and Policy Implications
worked together to push for political and economic reforms 
(OECD-DAC 2001; Tucker et al. 2002). 
Additionally, this report sheds light on the conditions under 
which Germany tends to exert more or less influence on re-
form efforts in low- and middle-income countries. Our analysis 
shows that the influence of Germany at the agenda-setting 
stage of the policymaking process is conditioned by a set of 
domestic and external factors. Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that “aid can’t buy reforms,”71 we find that when 
German aid represents a large proportion of a given partner 
country’s total aid portfolio, German development actors 
have more influence on the reform agendas of their partner 
countries. This effect, however, is conditional on the level 
of democracy in the countries where German development 
actors operate. Specifically, the positive correlation between 
Germany’s relative financial weight in a partner country and 
its perceived agenda-setting influence is, on average, more 
pronounced in more autocratic countries where reforms may 
be easier to implement due to the presence of fewer veto play-
ers that could otherwise obstruct or delay efforts to change 
the status quo (Faust 2010; Woo-Cumings 1999; Haggard 1990; 
Kelsall & Booth 2013). The fact that German aid wields greater 
influence in a cohort of less democratic countries that it 
generally disfavours at the partner selection stage of its aid al-
location process (Faust & Ziaja 2012) demands greater scrutiny 
and debate.72 At the same time, this finding suggests that there 
is wisdom in recent calls for increased country specialization 
and selectivity in Germany’s aid program.
Our findings also suggest that broad domestic support for 
reform – from the executive, the legislature, civil society 
groups, and other domestic stakeholders – amplifies Ger-
many’s development policy influence. Conversely, when the 
domestic conditions for reform are not propitious, Germany 
tends to exert lower levels of development policy influence. 
These findings raise the question of whether and how German 
development actors can do a better job of identifying and 
focusing advisory and assistance efforts in the settings where 
they are likely to enjoy a policy influence multiplier effect 
rather than face a policy influence penalty.73
The policy influence of German development actors depends 
not only on their relative financial weight and on the domestic 
political institutions of partner countries, but also on the level 
of competition in the “aid market.” Our analysis reveals that 
when a multitude of donors vie for influence, as indicated by 
higher levels of donor fragmentation, Germany tends to exert 
lower levels of agenda-setting influence. Germany’s recent 
efforts to concentrate its development aid in fewer partner 
countries (BMZ 2013; OECD-DAC 2015) may therefore help to 
expand its policy influence if other aid agencies follow suit and 
make efforts to establish a better-defined spatial and sectoral 
division of labour. 
Finally, this report calls attention to the need for further 
research on the extent to which these findings can be gener-
alized beyond Germany. In recognition of the fact that each 
donor agency has its own aid allocation logic, sectoral focus, 
objectives, and modalities of implementation (e.g., Alesina 
& Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2003), we have undertaken some 
preliminary tests to gauge whether our empirical results hold 
across a larger cohort of DAC bilateral donors (reported in 
Appendix E), but ultimately, testing the generalizability of 
our findings is beyond the scope of this report.74 The 2014 
Reform Efforts Survey offers a rich, micro-level source of 
data for researchers and evaluators to study this potential 
heterogeneity across different donors. This source of evidence 
also makes it possible to investigate the circumstances under 
which specific development partners exert greater influence 
on reform processes in host countries. As such, it provides a 
useful guide for those who seek to more effectively respond to 
71 See, for instance, Bandow (1999). 
72 According to Faust and Ziaja (2012), Germany tends to allocate larger amounts of aid to those countries with a greater degree of political freedom and accountability, which attests to Germany’s 
commitment to good governance as a “guiding principle” dictating the overall strategy of German development co-operation.
73 Some DAC donors have recently taken steps to improve their own “situational awareness” by investing in country-specific political economy analysis. DFID has pioneered the „Drivers of Change“ 
approach to political economy analysis to better understand pro-poor reform opportunities, incentives and obstacles (Warrener 2004; Chhotray & Hulme 2009). The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has developed a Strategic Governance And Corruption Analysis (SGACA), which focuses on the formal and informal factors that shape state-society relations. The Swedish International Development 
Agency has introduced „Power Analysis“ to understand where power lies, how it is distributed, and how it is employed (Bjuremalm 2006). In order to anticipate the likely „winners“ and „losers“ or 
particular policy reforms, the World Bank has also developed a methodology to support Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (World Bank 2003).
74 In Appendix E, we have conducted a simple econometric analysis of cross-national data seeking to explore whether our key hypotheses hold for DAC bilateral donors, more broadly. We find moderate 
evidence that our key findings hold when one expands the scope of analysis to other DAC bilateral development partners. Thus, future research should investigate more closely the generalizability of 
our findings in this study.
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the needs and demands of in-country stakeholders in low- and 
middle-income countries. 
Development partners currently expend a tremendous amount 
of time, money, and effort on efforts to instigate and imple-
ment policy and institutional change in developing countries. 
Demand for this type of external advice and assistance is 
expected to further increase during the post-2015 SDG era, as 
many developing countries seek to strengthen their domestic 
resource mobilization capabilities and create strong public 
sector institutions that are able to deliver high-quality public 
services without continued support from outside actors. Yet 
there is still an extraordinary lack of understanding about how 
development partners can most effectively influence reform 
efforts on the ground. The data from the 2014 Reform Efforts 
Survey provides an opportunity to close this evidence gap. 
It gives voice to those who are actually making and shaping 
policy in the developing world, providing them an opportunity 
to tell aid agencies which sources of advice and assistance are 
most and least useful to decision-makers on the ground.
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Table A 1 maps 24 different policy domains into six different 
policy clusters. These policy clusters are used for our 
sectoral-level analysis throughout the report. In Table A 2, 
we present an analysis of the composition of development 
policymakers and practitioners in our sample who worked 
directly with German embassies. As explained in Box 1, it was 
not until recent years that German embassies were formally 
mandated to lead a policy dialogue for development cooper-
ation. Given this new role now played by German embassies, 
it may be useful to shed light on what types of development 
policymakers and practitioners are likely to engage with them 
as a development partner.
To this end, we conduct a difference-in-means test on a set of 
variables capturing the nature of participants’ work, position, 
and sectoral focus, compared between those who interacted 
with German embassies and those who did not. Table A 2 
summarizes main results (and variable descriptions are given 
in the notes below the table). We first test if there is any 
significant difference in terms of the share of time survey 
participants normally spent working on political matters, tech-
nical issues, or administrative tasks.75 We find that those who 
interacted with German embassies tended to devote a greater 
share of their time (31%) working on political matters, which 
is significantly higher than the corresponding number for 
those who did not interact with German embassies (22%). We 
also find that participants who worked directly with German 
embassies tended to spend less time dealing with technical or 
administrative issues. 
Our analysis also reveals that those participants who took 
on high-rank government positions (e.g., the head of state, 
chief of staff, minister, or vice-minister) were more likely to 
interact with German embassies. The frequency of interaction 
with German embassies is significantly higher for those 
participants who served in high-ranking government positions 
(21%) compared to those who did not (12%). These findings 
partly reflect the fact that German embassies may serve as 
an important channel of communication between the BMZ 
and high-rank officials in their partner counties, while their 
level of engagement is less pronounced among lower-rank 
government officials with more “technical” roles, where direct 
communication is usually delegated to the implementing 
agencies.
Appendix A: Policy Domains, Policy Clusters, and an Analysis of Participants who Interacted with 
German Embassies
Table A 1: Policy Domains and Policy Clusters
Macroeconomic Social Agriculture Environment Governance Others
 • Macroeconomic 
Management
 • Finance, Credit, and 
Banking
 • Trade
 • Business Regulatory 
Environment
 • Investment
 • Health
 • Education
 • Family and Gender
 • Social Protection and 
Welfare
 • Labor
 • Agriculture and Rural 
Development
 • Land
 • Infrastructure
 • Environmental 
Protection
 • Energy and Mining
 • Decentralization
 • Anti-corruption and 
Transparency
 • Democracy
 • Public Administration
 • Justice and Security
 • Tax
 • Customs
 • Public Expenditure 
Management
 • Foreign Policy
 • No particular policy 
focus
75 The survey asked participants to indicate, on an average day working in their respective positions, “approximately what percentage of [their] time” was spent on each of the following: political 
matters, technical issues, and administrative tasks.
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Notes: POLITICAL, TECHNICAL, and ADMINISTRATIVE measure the proportion of time participants indicated they spent, based on their average workday, on political matters, technical issues, and 
administrative tasks, respectively. HIGH-LEVEL is a dummy variable coded 1 if a given participant had a high-level government position (e.g., the head of state, vice-head of state, chief of staff to 
the head of state, minister, or vice-minister); 0 otherwise. GOVT OFFICIALS, NGO/CSO, and PRIVATE are dummy variables coded 1 if a given participant belonged to the stakeholder group of host 
government officials, NGO/CSO leaders, or private sector representatives, respectively; 0 otherwise. MACROECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONEMNT, and GOVERNANCE are dummy 
variables coded 1 if a given participant belonged to the corresponding policy cluster; 0 otherwise.  Difference-in-means tests are conducted to evaluate whether those who interacted with German 
embassies differed significantly from those who did not in terms of the mean values of the variables of our interest. Asterisks indicate statistical significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
Table A 2: An Analysis of Those who Interacted (or Did Not Interact) with German Embassies as a Development Partner
Variable Mean Based on Participants Who 
Interacted with German Embassies
(A)
Mean Based on Participants Who 
Did Not Interact with German 
Embassies
(B)
Difference
(A)-(B)
Position Types
POLITICAL 0.311 0.220 0.090***
TECHNICAL 0.396 0.455 -0.059***
ADMINISTRATIVE 0.298 0.332 -0.034***
HIGH-LEVEL 0.213 0.123 0.090***
Stakeholder Groups
GOVT OFFICIALS 0.766 0.761 0.006
NGO/CSO 0.170 0.168 0.002
PRIVATE SECTOR 0.064 0.071 -0.008
Policy Clusters
MACROECONOMIC 0.199 0.182 0.016
SOCIAL 0.122 0.175 -0.053*
AGRICULTURE 0.056 0.080 -0.024
ENVIRONMENT 0.071 0.078 -0.007
GOVERNANCE 0.267 0.247 0.020
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In Figures B 1-B 3, we show the rankings of development 
partners by policy advice usefulness, agenda-setting influence, 
and helpfulness in reform implementation. Table B 1 reports 
numerical values used to generate Figure 11, which shows 
the policy-cluster specific averages of the three different 
donor-performance indicators for German development 
actors (German Embassies, GIZ, and KfW) as well as the EU 
and other DAC donors. Figure B 4 shows the performance of 
the German development actors, the EU, and DAC donors 
(collapsed as one unitary development actor) within particular 
policy domains under the policy clusters of governance and 
environment (See Table A 1 for details on how policy domains 
are clustered under six broader categories). These policy areas 
include the following: decentralization, anti-corruption and 
transparency, democracy, public administration, justice and 
security, public expenditure, as well as environmental protec-
tion and energy and mining. Table B 2 reports numerical values 
used to generate Figure B 4.
Appendix B: Comparisons of Development Partners by Policy Advice Usefulness, Agenda-Setting 
Influence, and Helpfulness in Reform Implementation
Figure B 1: Usefulness of Development Partners’ Policy Advice
Notes: We excluded all those development partners for which observations in the dataset did not exceed the minimum threshhold of 10.
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Figure B 2: Agenda-Setting Influence of Development Partners
Notes: We excluded all those development partners for which observations in the dataset did not exceed the minimum threshhold of 10.
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Figure B 3: Helpfulness of Development Partners in Reform Implementation
Notes: We excluded all those development partners for which observations in the dataset did not exceed the minimum threshhold of 10.
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2.72
2.72
2.74
2.74
2.81
2.84
2.86
2.88
2.89
2.90
2.93
2.94
2.96
2.99
2.99
2.99
3.00
3.00
3.00
3.02
3.02
3.04
3.04
1 2 3 40 1 2 3 40
Source: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
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Table B 1: Average Scores of Advice Usefulness, Agenda-Setting Influence, and Helpfulness in Reform Implementation, by 
Policy Cluster
Donor Name Policy Cluster Policy Advice Usefulness Agenda-Setting Influence Helpfulness in Reform 
Implementation
Score Std. Err N Score Std. Err N Score Std. Err N
German Embassies Macroeconomic 2.85 0.16 73 (47) 1.77 0.14 95 (58) 3.03 0.25 21 (19)
Social 3.40 0.22 44 (35) 2.40 0.16 53 (35) 2.59 0.29 17 (16)
Agriculture 2.26 0.23 20 (17) 2.16 0.26 29 (25) 2.82 0.48 12 (11)
Environment 3.32 0.26 28 (22) 2.69 0.32 32 (24) 3.37 0.27 21 (19)
Governance 2.88 0.20 72 (44) 2.34 0.16 116 (64) 2.89 0.18 49 (34)
GIZ Macroeconomic 3.44 0.15 130 (60) 2.43 0.14 156 (64) 3.26 0.11 87 (53)
Social 3.37 0.14 107 (60) 2.25 0.17 122 (64) 3.05 0.15 76 (47)
Agriculture 3.43 0.19 60 (39) 2.80 0.18 66 (41) 3.33 0.18 37 (26)
Environment 3.93 0.15 63 (49) 3.22 0.19 69 (46) 3.62 0.14 52 (39)
Governance 3.09 0.17 127 (52) 2.28 0.14 178 (64) 3.23 0.16 105 (49)
KfW Macroeconomic 3.21 0.19 69 (47) 1.89 0.17 83 (50) 2.89 0.17 39 (31)
Social 2.96 0.24 40 (28) 1.85 0.27 46 (28) 3.17 0.44 17 (11)
Agriculture 3.29 0.23 40 (26) 2.30 0.23 45 (29) 3.32 0.19 26 (22)
Environment 3.24 0.23 37 (26) 3.06 0.25 37 (25) 3.48 0.24 28 (22)
Governance 2.50 0.22 39 (28) 1.99 0.21 45 (32) 2.78 0.27 10 (9)
EU Macroeconomic 3.46 0.11 240 (90) 2.99 0.11 275 (97) 3.39 0.10 189 (88)
Social 3.38 0.11 214 (87) 3.03 0.10 250 (95) 3.37 0.09 197 (81)
Agriculture 3.21 0.16 102 (63) 3.01 0.13 115 (69) 3.38 0.14 89 (58)
Environment 3.15 0.17 82 (56) 3.08 0.17 92 (60) 3.35 0.17 73 (51)
Governance 3.37 0.10 287 (87) 3.15 0.10 425 (104) 3.38 0.09 333 (89)
DAC Average Macroeconomic 3.03 0.06 1475 (103) 2.18 0.06 1757 (105) 3.17 0.07 760 (95)
Social 3.29 0.06 1398 (108) 2.39 0.07 1692 (110) 3.27 0.05 980 (100)
Agriculture 3.18 0.09 727 (81) 2.35 0.08 796 (83) 3.38 0.08 381 (75)
Environment 3.25 0.10 514 (77) 2.34 0.10 585 (78) 3.14 0.10 320 (67)
Governance 3.16 0.07 1596 (98) 2.45 0.06 2349 (111) 3.19) 0.06 1297 (106)
Notes: The number of countries covered in each point estimate is reported in parentheses.
Source: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
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Figure B 4: The Average Scores of Advice Usefulness, Agenda-Setting Influence, and Helpfulness during Reform 
Implementation, by Select Policy Domains
Source: 2014 Reform 
Efforts Survey
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Table B 2: The Average Scores of Advice Usefulness, Agenda-Setting Influence, and Helpfulness in Reform Implementation, 
by Select Policy Domains
Actor Policy Cluster Policy Advice Usefulness Agenda-Setting Influence Helpfulness in Reform 
Implementation
Score Std. Err N Score Std. Err N Score Std. Err N
German Emb. Decentralization 4.50 0.35 2 (2) 2.00 0.94 3 (3) 5.00 0.00 1 (1)
Anti-corruption 
and transparency
3.43 0.53 7 (7) 2.07 0.29 17 (14) 2.88 0.33 8 (8)
Democracy 3.00 0.43 13 (12) 2.44 0.24 40 (29) 3.07 0.29 20 (15)
Public 
administration
2.63 0.35 16 (15) 2.86 0.40 14 (14) 3.67 0.55 3 (3)
Justice and 
security
3.09 0.32 21 (15) 2.43 0.31 24 (19) 2.58 0.29 12 (9)
Public expendi-
ture management
2.45 0.35 11 (11) 1.93 0.31 15 (15) 2.50 0.56 4 (4)
Environmental 
protection
3.22 0.30 20 (18) 2.83 0.36 24 (20) 3.31 0.32 14 (13)
Energy and 
mining
3.38 0.50 8 (8) 2.38 0.56 8 (8) 3.57 0.45 7 (7)
GIZ Decentralization 3.50 0.37 14 (12) 2.54 0.39 14 (12) 3.38 0.40 9 (8)
Anti-corruption 
and transparency
3.41 0.32 22 (19) 2.31 0.23 44 (33) 3.23 0.26 27 (21)
Democracy 3.29 0.44 8 (7) 2.37 0.28 29 (18) 3.17 0.30 23 (18)
Public 
administration
3.21 0.22 29 (20) 2.75 0.26 23 (18) 3.14 0.32 13 (11)
Justice and 
security
3.18 0.46 14 (11) 2.59 0.23 21 (16) 2.93 0.37 15 (12)
Public expendi-
ture management
2.65 0.27 34 (23) 1.70 0.25 39 (28) 3.50 0.39 14 (10)
Environmental 
protection
4.00 0.16 45 (36) 3.38 0.20 54 (39) 3.63 0.16 42 (33)
Energy and 
mining
3.68 0.27 18 (17) 2.42 0.35 15 (13) 3.44 0.35 10 (9)
KfW Decentralization 2.67 0.72 3 (3) 2.60 0.54 5 (5) 4.00 0.00 1 (1)
Anti-corruption 
and transparency
2.00 0.61 4 (4) 1.00 0.40 5 (5) N/A N/A N/A
Democracy 2.00 0.00 1 (1) 2.67 0.27 3 (3) 3.00 0.71 2 (2)
Public 
administration
2.25 0.30 6 (4) 2.00 0.62 4 (3) N/A N/A N/A
Justice and 
security
1.50 0.35 2 (2) 0.50 0.35 2 (2) N/A N/A N/A
Public expendi-
ture management
2.55 0.32 22 (19) 1.71 0.28 24 (19) 2.60 0.25 6 (5)
Environmental 
protection
3.43 0.26 25 (20) 3.07 0.26 31 (23) 3.25 0.29 21 (18)
Energy and 
mining
3.00 0.39 12 (10) 3.20 0.57 6 (5) 3.92 0.48 7 (8)
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EU Decentralization 3.62 0.28 20 (17) 3.01 0.28 25 (20) 3.50 0.28 16 (14)
Anti-corruption 
and transparency
3.35 0.16 46 (32) 3.26 0.13 84 (51) 3.31 0.16 65 (43)
Democracy 3.37 0.25 27 (18) 3.32 0.18 97 (54) 3.42 0.16 82 (49)
Public 
administration
3.31 0.18 57 (39) 3.09 0.22 54 (38) 3.32 0.17 43 (34)
Justice and 
security
3.19 0.22 53 (33) 3.24 0.19 73 (42) 3.39 0.16 59 (34)
Public expendi-
ture management
3.53 0.19 61 (43) 3.04 0.18 66 (48) 3.57 0.15 47 (37)
Environmental 
protection
3.32 0.19 59 (45) 3.22 0.18 68 (50) 3.35 0.19 55 (43)
Energy and 
mining
2.90 0.33 23 (20) 2.43 0.31 24 (21) 3.38 0.33 18 (17)
DAC Average Decentralization 3.56 0.15 100 (19) 2.71 0.16 120 (24) 3.35 0.13 81 (21)
Anti-corruption 
and transparency
3.16 0.13 258 (49) 2.54 0.11 462 (64) 3.19 0.11 255 (54)
Democracy 3.03 0.19 153 (28) 2.78 0.10 547 (66) 3.11 0.10 329 (60)
Public 
administration
3.32 0.11 356 (52) 2.44 0.13 329 (53) 3.30 0.13 185 (47)
Justice and 
security
3.08 0.12 284 (43) 2.78 0.13 372 (50) 3.25 0.10 237 (44)
Public expendi-
ture management
3.23 0.10 312 (52) 2.16 0.12 363 (56) 3.43 0.12 139 (40)
Environmental 
protection
3.25 0.12 346 (63) 2.30 0.11 423 (70) 3.08 0.12 247 (56)
Energy and 
mining
3.19 0.16 168 (36) 2.48 0.16 162 (31) 3.26 0.15 73 (29)
Notes: The number of countries covered in each point estimate is reported in parentheses.
Source: 2014 Reform Efforts Survey
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics
Table C 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CPA1 (ln) 6109 1.066 1.111 -3.289 2.899
DEMOCRACY 6109 3.673 4.721 -9 10
FRAG 6109 31.565 12.101 5.714 70.856
CPA2 (ln) 6109 -0.990 1.942 -12.516 2.015
GDP PER CAPITA (in thousand) 6109 1.555 1.518 0.150 13.235
GDP GROWTH 6109 5.296 2.343 -0.215 12.925
POP (ln) 6109 16.444 1.369 13.395 21.006
PARTNER98 6109 0.743 0.437 0.000 1.000
PARTNER08-11 6109 0.612 0.487 0.000 1.000
GERMAN EXP (ln) 6109 -4.305 1.891 -8.998 1.426
SEX 6109 0.242 0.429 ]0.000 1.000
MULTI 6109 0.908 0.288 0.000 1.000
DOMESTIC SUPPORT 6109 3.925 2.516 0.000 12.000
DISTANCE (ln) 6109 8.624 0.544 -8.998 1.426
EXP 6109 3.589 1.287 1.000 5.000
INTERACT (ln) 6109 1.853 0.739 0.000 3.611
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of the main variables used for Model 2 in Table 4-1.
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Appendix D: Robustness Checks
Table D 1: Robustness Checks: Determinants of Germany’s Agenda-Setting Influence (Outcome Stage Only)
Robustness Checks Reform Focus Variables as 
Additional Controls
Position Types as 
Additional Controls
Using Freedom  House 
(FH) Scores
Excluding Outliers
Models (1) (2) (3) (4)
CPA1 (ln)
0.390
(0.196)**
0.383
(0.190)**
0.644
(0.246)***
0.405
(0.156)***
DEMOCRACY
0.028
(0.019)
0.030
(0.019)
0.018
(0.019)
CPA1 (ln) ×DEMOCRACY
-0.029
(0.013)**
-0.030
(0.014)**
-0.023
(0.013)*
FH
0.106
(0.073)
CPA1 (ln) × FH
-0.084
(0.047)*
FRAG
-0.019
(0.008)**
-0.018
(0.008)**
-0.019
(0.008)**
-0.019
(0.007)***
CPA2 (ln)
-0.087
(0.160)
-0.063
(0.159)
-0.060
(0.139)
-0.119
(0.139)
GDP PER CAPITA
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
GDP GROWTH
-0.020
(0.033)
-0.024
(0.037)
-0.009
(0.034)
-0.015
(0.030)
POP (ln)
-0.013
(0.136)
-0.015
(0.133)
-0.018
(0.116)
-0.075
(0.118)
PARTNER98
-0.012
(0.193)
0.032
(0.205)
-0.118
(0.167)
-0.039
(0.170)
PARTNER08-11
-0.206
(0.172)
-0.246
(0.171)
-0.216
(0.171)
-0.051
(0.156)
GERMAN EXP (ln)
-0.010
(0.084)
-0.034
(0.089)
-0.015
(0.080)
0.033
(0.073)
DISTANCE (ln)
0.054
(0.201)
-0.060
(0.236)
0.087
(0.191)
0.016
(0.182)
MULTI
-0.477
(0.308)
-0.505
(0.306)*
-0.469
(0.316)
-0.514
(0.260)**
DOMESTIC SUPPORT
0.091
(0.024)***
0.090
(0.023)***
0.090
(0.023)***
0.096
(0.021)***
REFORM FOCUS
0.113
(0.159)
0.100
(0.156)
0.085
(0.151)
REFORM ATTEMPT
-0.145
(0.129)
-0.130
(0.126)
-0.140
(0.126)
POLITICAL
-0.030
(0.168)
TECHNICAL
-0.131
(0.146)
GIZ
0.398
(0.136)***
0.426
(0.139)***
0.429
(0.134)***
0.455
(0.121)***
67 Appendix D  |  7.
KfW
0.185
(0.123)
0.165
(0.124)
0.173
(0.120)
0.168
(0.106)
Europe and Central 0.099 -0.170 0.085 0.273
Asia (0.358) (0.398) (0.362) (0.323)
Latin America and -0.546 -0.453 -0.529 -0.338
the Caribbean (0.293)* (0.503) (0.297)* (0.265)
Middle East and -0.472 -0.553 -0.317 -0.353
North Africa (0.378) (0.383) (0.349) (0.346)
South Asia
-0.523
(0.317)*
-0.509
(0.319)
-0.380
(0.280)
-0.270
(0.260)
Sub-Saharan Africa
-0.578
(0.220)***
-0.573
(0.227)**
-0.525
(0.225)**
-0.387
(0.204)*
Macroeconomic
-0.059
(0.197)
-0.016
(0.192)
-0.094
(0.194)
-0.125
(0.167)
Social
0.171
(0.204)
0.178
(0.201)
0.120
(0.200)
0.161
(0.177)
Agriculture
0.152
(0.231)
0.172
(0.230)
0.106
(0.226)
0.190
(0.213)
Environment
0.618
(0.268)**
0.586
(0.263)**
0.562
(0.248)**
0.993
(0.203)***
Governance
0.063
(0.208)
0.103
(0.204)
-0.022
(0.202)
0.127
(0.181)
CSO/NGO
-0.044
(0.153)
-0.054
(0.154)
-0.031
(0.149)
-0.003
(0.144)
Private Sector
-0.496
(0.208)**
-0.532
(0.203)***
-0.524
(0.199)***
-0.427
(0.196)**
Language Dummies Yes Yes No No
Position Dummies No Yes No No
N 1021 1021 1113 1035
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by participant. Non-response weights are applied to all these regressions. N/A means that variables are dropped due to collinearity. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
Source: Own calculations
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Appendix E: Cross-National Regressions for DAC Bilateral Donors 
Throughout this report, our analysis focuses on Germany as an 
illustrative case. Our main findings suggest that aid intensity, 
the level of democracy, donor fragmentation, and domestic 
support are four key factors that coalesce to affect the 
influence of German development partners on reform efforts 
in host countries. 
Whether these findings travel beyond Germany is an em-
pirical question that goes beyond the scope of this report; 
however, we conduct an exploratory econometric exercise to 
test the generalizability of our findings using cross-national 
regressions. Our dependent variable of interest is now the 
country-level measure of agenda-setting influence for all 
DAC bilateral donors (either including or excluding German 
development actors).76 This variable is calculated based on 
responses from survey participants who evaluated major DAC 
bilateral donor agencies in terms of their influence on the 
government’s decision to pursue reforms. 
Our key variables of interest are the amount of CPA that a giv-
en country received from DAC bilateral donors (as a percent-
age share of total CPA disbursed across all countries during 
the same time period, which we refer to as CPA1); the level of 
democracy measured by the average Polity score (DEMOCRA-
CY); donor fragmentation based on the OECD-DAC measure 
of fragmentation (FRAG); and the level of domestic support 
based on the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey, which is the coun-
try-level average of the number of domestic actors identified 
by participants to have expended “substantial time, effort, or 
resources to promote” reforms (DOMESTIC SUPPORT).77 We 
use the log of GDP per capita (GDP PER CAPITA), GDP growth 
(GDP GROWTH), and the log of population (POP (ln)) as 
additional controls. In these regressions, we exclude countries 
from our analysis if the number of participants in those 
countries does not meet the minimum threshold of 10 (or 15) 
observations for the survey-based variables (agenda-setting 
influence, which is the dependent variable, and DOMESTIC 
SUPPORT).
Table E 1 summarizes the main results. In Models 1 and 3, we 
use the DAC average of agenda-setting influence including 
German development actors as the dependent variable while 
Models 2 and 4 exclude German development partners. Our 
results show moderate evidence that the share of CPA is pos-
itively correlated with the perceived level of agenda-setting 
influence (p<0.10 for Models 2 and 4), while this effect is again 
conditioned by the level of democracy, as indicated by the 
statistically significant negative effects of the interaction term 
(CPA1 (ln)×DEMOCRACY) in Models 1 and 2. However, the 
effect of the interaction is somewhat sensitive to the inclusion 
criteria (the threshold of 10 or 15) for the survey-based varia-
bles (see Models 3 and 4). The effect of donor fragmentation 
has an expected negative sign but is not significant. Domestic 
support also has an expected positive sign and its effect is 
significant at the 0.05 level across all the models. 
In short, these preliminary findings are inconclusive. The 
patterns observed are largely consistent with our predictions; 
however, the observed effects are sensitive to different model 
specifications – for example, how the dependent variable is 
specified and which countries are included in the models. The 
inconclusive nature of our findings suggests the possibility 
of significant heterogeneity across different development 
actors. Understanding whether and to what extent the 
Germany-specific findings in this study “travel” to other 
development partners is an important question that merits 
further examination. 
Consider, by way of illustration, the finding in this study 
that German aid wields greater agenda-setting influence in 
autocratic countries. If this finding holds across all or most de-
velopment partners, then the “ease of reform implementation” 
explanation that we offer should be reasonably convincing. 
However, if this finding is mostly specific to Germany, it would 
also be reasonable to ask whether German development 
actors might have a comparative strength in less democratic 
settings.
76 The country-level measure of agenda-setting influence is the average of participants’ ratings of each DAC bilateral donor’ influence on the government’s pursuit of reforms on a scale of 0 (no influ-
ence) to 5 (maximum influence), which is weighted equally across different policy clusters and across all DAC bilateral donors for each country.
77 The country-level measure of domestic support is weighted equally across different policy clusters, just as in the case for the dependent variable weighted equally across different policy clusters. 
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Table E 1: Cross-sectional Regression Results
Models (1) (2) (3) (4)
CPA1 (ln)
0.118
(0.100)
0.185
(0.104)*
0.120
(0.121)
0.203
(0.118)*
DEMOCRACY
-0.080
(0.045)*
-0.084
(0.043)*
-0.040
(0.067)
-0.053
(0.067)
CPA1 (ln) ×DEMOCRACY
-0.017
(0.008)**
-0.018
(0.008)**
-0.012
(0.011)
-0.015
(0.012)
FRAG
-0.004
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.005)
-0.007
(0.005)
-0.007
(0.006)
DOMESTIC SUPPORT
0.237
(0.084)***
0.253
(0.094)***
0.222
(0.082)***
0.219
(0.085)**
GDP PER CAPITA
-0.232
(0.066)***
-0.243
(0.076)***
-0.196
(0.066)***
-0.180
(0.067)***
GDP GROWTH
0.011
(0.022)
0.013
(0.022)
0.000
(0.028)
0.005
(0.027)
POP (ln)
-0.049
(0.055)
-0.064
(0.057)
-0.051
(0.058)
-0.065
(0.058)
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Minimum Threshold 10 10 15 15
R-squared 0.36 0.45 0.45 0.46
N 85 85 71 71
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. We drop those countries where there were less than 10 (or 15) observations in the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey to compute agenda-setting 
influence and domestic support variables (to alleviate imprecision around the point estimates). Asterisks indicate statistical significance: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. While Models 1 and 3 use the 
average of agenda-setting influence for DAC donors including German development partners as the dependent variable, Models 2 and 4 use the DAC average agenda-setting influence excluding 
German development partners. Models 1 and 2 impose the minimum threshold of 10 as inclusion criteria and Models 3 and 4 use 15 instead.
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